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EFFECTS OF PROCESS VS. OUTCOME ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND IDENTIFIABILITY ON SOLUTION QUALITY 
Megan Potter, MA 
University of Nebraska, 1998
Advisor: Dr. Lisa L. Scherer
This study investigated the effect of accountability, responsibility, and identifiability 
on the quality of solutions generated to an ill-defined problem. Accountable participants 
provided written justification for their output, either the solution generation process 
(process accountability) or the solution generation outcome (outcome accountability). 
Participants perceived themselves as either sharing responsibility for solution generation 
with others (shared responsibility) or solely responsible for solution generation (sole 
responsibility). Lastly, participants were either identifiable, such that their responses 
could be traced to them personally, or anonymous. Solution quality was measured by 
resolving power, or the degree to which a solution resolves conflicting aspects of the
problem. All participants were asked to read an ill-defined problem, generate as many
/
solutions as possible to the problem, and choose the solution they felt was best. No 
predictions were supported and a number of unexpected findings occurred. 
Unaccountable and outcome accountability participants each generated higher quality 
best solutions than participants in the process accountability conditions. Participants who 
shared responsibility generated a higher number of resolving alternatives and a greater 
proportion of resolving alternatives than participants who were solely responsible for 
solution generation. Lastly, an interaction between identifiability and accountability was
discovered for the proportion of resolving alternatives. Post-hoc comparisons revealed 
that highly identifiable but unaccountable participants generated a higher proportion of 
resolving solutions than highly identifiable participants in either outcome or process 
accountability conditions. Implications for individual and group problem solving and 
suggestions for future research are discussed.
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1Effects of Process vs. Outcome Accountability, Responsibility, 
and Identifiability on Solution Quality
Overview of the Problem
In every day life and in organizational contexts, people are faced with the task of 
solving problems, many of which are accompanied by uncertainty and hesitation because 
they have no one correct answer. These types of problems can be labeled as “ill-defined” 
because it is often not perfectly clear exactly what the problem is or what routes or 
measures should be taken to arrive at high quality solutions (Abelson & Levi, 1985).
Much research has been devoted to this common problem and has attempted to determine 
how to maximize the quality of the final decision for ill-defined problems. This line of 
research has taken several approaches to achieving this goal by focusing on the different 
stages or phases of the problem solving process that individuals go through to arrive at a 
final solution. A review hy Abelson and Levi (1985) describes four basic stages of ill- 
defined problem solving as problem recognition, alternative generation, alternative 
evaluation, and alternative selection. Essentially, these steps involve identifying the 
existence of a problem, generating possible solutions or alternatives, evaluating these 
solutions, and ultimately choosing the solution which is perceived to be the best alternative 
and implementing it. Research by Herek, Janis, and Huth (1987) has demonstrated the 
importance and benefit of focusing attention on each of these stages. Herek et al. 
determined that high quality decision making procedures are often associated with better 
outcomes. Their analysis of 19 international crises led to the suggestion that vigilant 
problem solvers who carefully attend to the appropriate steps will more likely (although
2not always) end up with a better outcome. However, despite the importance of the quality 
of all phases, little research has focused on the solution generation phase of the problem 
solving process for ill defined problems. It is important that this stage be addressed 
because lack of attention to this stage or any other is likely to cause the overall decision 
quality to suffer.
Several approaches have been used to identify important influences on solution 
generation. One approach has attempted to identify stable qualities of problem solvers that 
influence solution generation. This individual difference perspective has primarily focused 
on individual qualities, such as expertise, that affect a person’s ability to generate high 
quality solutions. For example, it has been shown that individuals who are considered 
experts in a given domain tend to be better at developing good solutions for problems in 
that domain (Butler, 1995).
Another research approach has aimed at improving the problem solver’s ability to 
generate solutions by providing them with decision aids. Problem structuring techniques 
are decision aids which attempt to guide the development of better solutions. For example, 
Pitz, Sachs, and Heerboth (1980) found that structuring a problem by having participants 
generate solutions to problem objectives presented one at a time led to a higher quantity of 
solutions generated (compared to structuring the problem by presenting all objectives 
simultaneously, presenting examples of solutions, or providing no structure). Scherer and 
Billings (1986) farther revealed that the way in which problem objectives are presented 
(e.g., in conflicting pairs, congruent pairs, or individually) can influence the quality of
3solutions generated. It should be noted that the goal of the above approaches focuses on 
the problem solver’s ability to generate solutions.
Another perspective for understanding and predicting solution generation emphasizes 
a problem solving motivation or willingness to work hard at coming up with good 
solutions. There may be individual differences in such motivation, such as need for 
cognition, for example. Some individuals prefer to engage in complex thinking, whereas 
others would prefer to engage in tasks which require little thought (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1981). It is also possible that motivators outside of the individual can function to increase 
an individual’s willingness to exert effort. For example, individuals working on a very 
important problem or decision for which they are responsible and accountable may feel 
motivated to work harder. The assumption is that increased motivation will lead to 
increased effort, which will ultimately lead to more high quality solutions.
It should be noted that none of the above means of improving problem solving is 
necessarily better than another. Furthermore, they should not be thought of as entirely 
independent of one another, as it would be possible to use them in conjunction with one 
another. However, motivational influences on effort can be used for all individuals and for 
all types of problems. For example, they do not require knowledge of the particular 
objectives of the problem and can therefore be applied in a multitude of situations.
A host of variables has been suggested to influence cognitive effort, including 
decision significance, irreversibility, and consequentially. In addition, making the decision 
maker or problem solver identifiable, accountable, or responsible has been shown to affect 
cognitive effort. Early research by McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach (1979) showed that
4when decisions are significant and cannot be reversed, and when the decision maker is 
responsible for his actions, greater effort is invested in the decision. This increased effort 
results in the use of more analytic decision strategies. Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) found 
that having to justify a judgment can lead to greater consistency in judgment policy. 
Weldon and Gargano (1988) also found that people who were accountable, or expected to 
justify their judgments, and solely responsible for their responses used more complex 
judgment strategies. Past research has shown that when individual efforts are identifiable, 
this identifiability leads to an increase in various types of efforts (Latane, Williams, & 
Harkins, 1979; Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981), but only one has been within the 
problem solution generation domain. Scherer (1985) showed that people whose responses 
were identifiable tended to generate more high quality solutions than those whose 
responses were not identifiable.
For all of the above motivational influences, there is a common goal to increase the 
willingness of individuals to exert more effort, presumably in order to improve 
performance. However, much of the effects of accountability, responsibility, and 
identifiability as motivational influences have been obscured because of the lack of 
consistency and clarity with which the research has been conducted.
While neither label is necessarily more correct, accountability and responsibility have 
sometimes been used interchangeably in the literature, and their operationalization often 
varies from study to study. With respect to accountability, common language tends to 
define it as liability or responsibility (McKechnie, 1983). However, the bulk of empirical 
work on this variable has tended to refer to it as having to provide as account for, or
5justify, one’s views or actions (Tetlock, 1985b). Research on the effects of this definition 
of accountability on impression formation tasks, expression of opinions or attitudes, and 
various judgments and decision tasks has shown evidence of both its enhancing and 
debilitating effects. These effects often depend on the task, the person to whom the 
individual is accountable, and other situation characteristics. Essentially, the effects of 
being accountable, or having to justify one’s views, are not clear cut or straight forward.
Other research has operationalized accountability in a manner which is somewhat 
more consistent with every day use of the term. This research has manipulated 
accountability by making participants solely responsible for their decisions, versus sharing 
responsibility for decisions with others. This type of manipulation is obviously different 
from requiring participants to justify their responses to another individual. One can 
imagine the processes as being somewhat different in nature because accountability with 
justification implies being able to defend a decision, whereas responsibility implies an 
additional component of ownership of outcomes. In fact, this same manipulation, 
involving the assignment of sole versus shared responsibility, is often the procedure used 
in studies of the effects of responsibility. In situations involving this type of manipulation, 
the degree of perceived ownership of outcomes is likely to be reduced when responsibility 
is shared among individuals. In this way, it serves as a useful means of varying 
responsibility. However, another important component of responsibility is the importance 
of the outcomes to the individual and to others. Tn order to induce a heightened sense of 
responsibility, it is important that the decision task, the decision outcomes, and the 
consequences of the outcomes be important to the decision maker. Whereas it might be
6argued that decision significance and consequentially are factors independent of 
responsibility, it is argued here that in real life decisions, these factors are often consistent 
with and determinants of the degree of responsibility an individual tends to perceive. It is 
therefore important that the operationalization of responsibility involve a problem or 
decision whose consequences are perceived as both real and important to the individual.
In addition to the definitional and operational inconsistencies found in the study of 
accountability and responsibility, both variables have often been confounded with 
identifiability, which is known to have its own effects, independent o f accountability and 
responsibility. Participants who are not accountable or share responsibility are often 
unidentifiable, making conclusions regarding the independent effects of any of these 
variables difficult to draw. In sum, the inconsistency in research on accountability, 
responsibility, and identifiability makes it difficult to determine a clear pattern of results. 
Furthermore, with the exception of Scherer’s (1985) previously mentioned identifiability 
study, no studies have examined the effects of these motivational influences on the 
solution generation stage for ill-defined problems. It is for these reasons that the primary 
goal of this study was to examine the effects of accountability, responsibility, and 
identifiability on the generation of solutions to ill-defined problems.
A second problem appears to be inherent to past research on accountability. In most 
cases, participants have been only vaguely informed of exactly what they are accountable 
for, or exactly what they will have to justify. They are never told exactly what the 
researcher is measuring. Whereas it is often the case that informing participants about 
what will be measured will defeat the purpose of the study, this may not always be the
7case for accountability. Participants must be clear about what they will have to justify. 
Consider a real life situation in which better performance of a particular task is desired. If 
accountability were the chosen means of improving such performance, one would make 
the performer accountable for the specific performance level that is desired. In other 
words, the desired result should be quite clear, and that is what the performer should be 
accountable for. Consider a more specific example in which higher quality solutions to ill- 
defined problems are desired. In order to use accountability to enhance such performance, 
the problem solver should be made accountable specifically for higher quality solutions.
In some cases, however, making individuals accountable simply for the end product 
is not the best means to arrive at an improved end product. Many times it is the process by 
which one arrives at the end product which is most important. In these cases, 
accountability must be directed toward the process itself. The importance of process in 
problem solving is evidenced by the previously mentioned benefits of problem structuring 
(Pitz et al., 1980; Scherer & Billings, 1986). When attention was directed to the problem 
solving process through problem structuring, the outcome was more high quality 
solutions. Research by Herek et al.(1987) has also shown a relationship between high 
quality decision making procedures and favorable outcomes. They found that when 
outcomes were not favorable, they were associated with incomplete use of available 
information. So whereas one part o f the process, information search, was satisfactory, 
another part of the process, information utilization, was inadequate. Although causal 
conclusions cannot be made from this study, the results do suggest that poor problem 
solving procedures may lead to poor outcomes in some cases. Given these studies which
8support a relationship between process and outcome for problem solving, it appears that 
motivational attempts to enhance the process may ultimately enhance the outcomes which 
follow. It was therefore a secondary goal of this study to examine the influence of 
accountability for the process versus accountability for the outcome on solution generation 
for ill-defined problems.
The discussion which follows begins with a review of the one other study which has 
thus far also recognized a potential distinction between process accountability and 
outcome accountability. Subsequent discussion will review the literature on accountability 
studies in which participants were accountable for some type of outcome or end result. 
These participants were not accountable for any of the processes by which they arrived at 
the outcomes, but only for the outcomes, which tended to vary from study to study. The 
review will address the formation of impressions, the expression of opinions and attitudes, 
and a variety of judgments and decisions. Next, a similar format will be followed in 
addressing research reflecting the effects of accountability for a process. It is important to 
note that with the exception of the first study mentioned above, past research has not 
specifically addressed process versus outcome accountability. However, research has 
differed in the extent to which the instructions lend themselves to a process interpretation 
or to an outcome interpretation. Therefore, although most past research has not made any 
mention of a distinction between the two types of accountability, one will be made here.
In the one study that has thus far indicated the existence of at least two types of 
accountability, procedural and outcome accountability, Siegal-Jacobs and Yates (1996) 
had participants make a probability judgment regarding the likelihood that an individual
9held a particular attitude, based on background information about the individual. Some of 
the background information was in fact predictive, whereas some was not. Participants 
were assigned to one of three accountability conditions: procedural, outcome, or no 
accountability. Participants in the procedural accountability condition were told that an 
interview would later be conducted to determine why and how certain information was 
used to arrive at a probability judgment. Outcome accountability participants were told 
that they would later be given feedback regarding the accuracy of their judgment (true 
values were known) and that the top five performers would receive a bonus prize for 
accuracy. Lastly, unaccountable participants were told that their answers would be 
anonymous and confidential. Multiple detailed dependent measures were assessed to 
examine probability judgment accuracy. Only those that are relevant to the study’s results 
will be addressed.
The authors hypothesized that procedural accountability would have more beneficial 
effects on judgment performance than outcome accountability because there is less 
pressure and stress associated with simply having to arrive at a justifiable procedure, 
versus having to arrive at a justifiable outcome, the quality of which may often vary due to 
various uncertainties. Results showed that procedure accountability participants had 
higher calibration, which means that they gave judgments that most closely resembled the 
true probability, relative to outcome accountability and unaccountable participants. In 
addition, they also had lower discrimination, meaning that, they tended to attempt to use 
the nonpredictive information as well as the predictive information in making their 
judgments. Lastly, outcome accountability was shown to have only negative effects,
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compared not only to procedural accountability but also to no accountability. Outcome 
accountability resulted in greater scatter, an indication of the extent to which judgments 
vary around their conditional means.
The authors suggested that outcome accountability may have produced more stress, 
which then resulted in more inconsistent response patterns. Their results show that 
accountability directed at the procedure can have beneficial effects, while accountability 
for an outcome may have detrimental or negligible effects. More importantly, Siegal- 
Jacobs and Yates concluded that it is necessary that attention be drawn to the nature of 
the accountability instructions and what participants are being held accountable for.
It is extremely important to note that although this study provides considerable 
support for the notion that a distinction ought to be made between procedural and 
outcome accountability, the operationalization of these two types of accountability is not 
entirely consistent with "those used in the current study. Although the procedural 
accountability is similar to that used here, the outcome accountability is very different. It 
seems that Siegal-Jacobs and Yates’ operationalization of outcome accountability more 
closely resembles that of the consequentially of the judgment, an outcome which, as the 
authors have pointed out, is likely to be very uncertain, since participants may have little 
or no control over it. This study did not intend to examine outcome accountability in 
conjunction with any of the consequences which follow. Instead, the overall distinction 
between process and outcome accountability is yet more refined, and the study addresses 
the difference between being accountable simply for arriving at a good problem solution 
(outcome accountability) and being accountable for the process used to arrive at a good
11
problem solution (process accountability). Whereas this refined distinction may not be 
applicable in all types of situations where accountability is likely to be imposed, it is 
believed to be particularly applicable to the problem solving domain, where attention to 
the process of problem solving is likely to enhance the quality of the outcome.
Outcome Accountability
In the following studies, participants were made accountable for the responses they 
gave concerning their impressions of other individuals, their opinions and attitudes toward 
controversial issues, and their judgments or decisions. Participants were not asked to be 
able to explain which information they used to arrive at their responses, only that they be 
able to describe why the solutions were good solutions.
Impression formation. In one of his earlier studies, Tetlock (1983b) examined the 
influence of accountability on the perseverance of first impressions of a fictitious 
defendant’s guilt or innocence. Accountability was manipulated by informing participants 
that they would either have to justify their impressions of the accused person’s guilt or 
innocence to an associate of the experimenter or not. Previous research had shown the 
tendency for initial impressions to strongly influence the interpretation of later information 
and subsequent impressions; this is known as the primacy effect. The study was conducted 
to determine whether accountability would cause participants to be less susceptible to the 
primacy effect. Tetlock thought that accountable participants would experience increased 
motivation to attend to all the information and would he therefore less prone to the 
primacy effect.
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Participants were told that they would read a description of a court case and 18 brief 
summaries of evidence about the case and give their impressions of the accused person’s 
guilt or innocence. Accountable participants were also told that the study was concerned 
with the “interpersonal communication of beliefs and attitudes.” Participants did not know 
exactly what types of responses they would be asked to give, other than their impressions.
Accountability and order of information were the independent variables. Order of 
information was manipulated by the placement of favorable and unfavorable information 
about the defendant. The order of evidence was varied such that participants either read 
evidence in favor of the defendant followed by evidence against the defendant or vice 
versa. In the third condition evidence in favor of and against the defendant was randomly 
alternated. The three accountability conditions included: (a) no accountability, (b) pre­
exposure accountability, and (c) post-exposure accountability. Participants in the no 
accountability conditioriwere told that their responses would be confidential and not 
traceable to them personally. Participants in the other two conditions were told that they 
“would later be asked to justify their impressions of the accused person’s guilt or 
innocence to an associate of the experimenter.” The difference between the two 
accountability conditions was the timing of the instructions. In the pre-exposure 
accountability condition, participants were informed of their accountability before reading 
the information about the case. In the post-exposure condition, participants were informed 
of their accountability after reading all the information.
Dependent variables included a rating from 0 to 100 of each participant’s impression 
of the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime and their verdict of guilty or
13
innocent. Participants were also asked to recall as much evidence from the case as 
possible, and this recall was coded for the number of items that were pro- or anti­
defendant.
Results showed a main effect for order of information such that participants who 
read the evidence against the defendant first rated the defendant as more likely to be guilty 
than participants who read this information last. The authors interpreted this as evidence 
of the primacy effect. There was no main effect of accountability on the likelihood of the 
defendant’s guilt. However, planned comparisons showed that pre-exposure accountability 
participants (those told they would have to justify their impressions prior to reading the 
evidence) did not demonstrate a primacy effect; that is, they were unaffected by the order 
of information provided. In addition, these participants showed better recall, remembering 
significantly more evidence (both pro- and anti-defendant) than unaccountable participants 
and participants informed of their accountability after reading the evidence. There were no 
effects for the dichotomous judgment of guilt or innocence.
The author suggested that accountability eliminated the primacy effect in pre­
exposure conditions by affecting participants’ encoding and processing, not by enhancing 
their recall. If accountability simply led to greater recall, this would have been shown in 
post-exposure accountability conditions as well, but it was not. Based on the enhanced 
recall of pre-exposure accountable participants, it was first suggested that these 
participants encoded the material more elaborately and processed it more deeply than 
post-exposure or unaccountable participants. However, the authors warned not to 
conclude that it is the depth of processing which leads to elimination of the primacy effect.
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Further analyses showed that when primacy effects did occur they were not mediated by 
selective recall of evidence. In other words, it would not be accurate to conclude that 
greater recall in the pre-exposure condition is evidence for deeper, more elaborate 
processing, despite the fact that it is often a result of deeper processing. It was instead 
suggested that accountability may have interfered with the biased assimilation of later 
evidence into initial impressions. That is, participants may have been more careful about 
the conclusions they jumped to or more open to information revealed subsequent to their 
first impressions.
The following research addresses the role of accountability as a potential means of 
somehow motivating individuals to be more accurate in the formation of impressions of 
other people. More specifically, it addresses the role of accountability in motivating 
greater cognitive effort to reduce a common person perception error, known as the 
fundamental attribution error. It should be noted that an investigation of the effects of 
accountability on common judgmental biases, such as the fundamental attribution error, 
can reveal whether these biases are the result o f a lack of ability or a lack of motivation 
and effort.
Tetlock (1985a) examined the effects of accountability on the attributions individuals 
made for a writer, based on a sample of the writer’s work. Accountability was 
manipulated by informing participants that they would have to justify their impressions of 
the writer to an associate of the experimenter. Previous research had demonstrated the 
tendency for people to make internal attributions for others’ behavior, despite the 
existence of potential external causes; this has been labeled the fundamental attribution
15
error. Tetlock hypothesized that accountability would serve to prevent faulty attributions 
in one of two ways. One way would be by motivating individuals to increase the amount 
of cognitive effort and carefulness allocated to the judgment task. A second process by 
which accountability might reduce faulty attributions is by leading people to be more 
cautious about what attributions they are willing to express and attempt to justify.
Participants read an essay on minority quota systems in college admissions and 
answered a series of questions regarding their impressions of the writer and their 
confidence of those impressions. Accountability, the direction of the essay (pro- or anti­
affirmative action) and the degree of writer choice were the independent variables. 
Accountable participants were told that they would later be asked to justify their 
impressions of the writer to an associate of the experimenter, who was interested in the 
"person-perception process.’ These participants were informed either before reading the 
essay (pre-exposure accountability) or after reading the essay (post-exposure 
accountability). The manipulation of the timing of the accountability instructions was done 
to test the two previously mentioned possible effects of accountability. If accountability 
were to operate by causing participants to devote greater cognitive effort to the task, then 
pre-exposure accountability would have an effect, whereas post-exposure accountability 
would not, because the task would already be completed. However, if accountability were 
to operate by simply altering the attributions people are willing to express, then both pre- 
and post-exposure accountability would show effects on the attributions participants 
make. Again, participants who were not accountable were told that their responses were 
confidential. Before reading the essay, participants were told that the writer had either
16
chosen (high-choice condition) or been assigned (low-choice condition) his position on the 
issue. The essays either supported or opposed affirmative action. The dependent measures 
included participants’ estimations of the writer’s attitudes about the essay topic and other 
similar issues. Responses to all questions were given on a 21-point rating scale.
Evidence for the overattribution effect was found, such that participants’ impressions 
of the writer’s attitudes corresponded to the direction of the essay, whether the writer was 
believed to have chosen or not chosen the direction of the essay. However, pre-exposure 
accountability was found to moderate the overattribution effect; these participants were 
less likely to make extreme attitude attributions to the low-choice writer. It was suggested 
that this was not due simply to changes in what participants were willing to say because 
post-exposure accountability participants’ responses were almost as strong as those made 
by unaccountable participants. If accountability acted to make participants more cautious 
about what they were willing to say, then responses from both pre- and post- exposure 
participants should be equally moderate. Instead, the responses of post-exposure 
participants were no less extreme than those of participants who were not accountable.
In addition, no significant differences in attributions were found across conditions for 
the high-choice writer. In other words, the extremity of attributions for the high-choice 
writer was equal across accountability conditions. This also argues against the possibility 
that accountability operates by altering the responses people are willing to express, 
otherwise this effect would have been evident in the high-choice condition as well
Analysis of participants’ confidence in their attributions yielded a significant writer 
choice X accountability interaction. Pre-exposure accountability led to lower confidence
17
relative to both unaccountability and post-exposure accountability. These results were 
consistent with those of the previously reported study, and the author’s interpretations 
were similar.
Because of the different effects for pre- and post-exposure accountability, Tetlock 
concluded that the mechanism by which accountability altered attributions was by placing 
participants in a more analytic and vigilant mental set and serving to prevent, rather than 
reverse, the common judgmental bias. This prevention is thought to occur because 
individuals engage in what he calls “pre-emptive self-criticism,” in which they imagine 
possible deficiencies in their position and also possible positive aspects of alternate 
positions. This can be regarded as a result of increased cognitive effort, rather than 
increased motivation to express the most justifiable attribution.
A study by Rozelle and Baxter (1981) examined the effects of both accountability 
and responsibility on participants’ perceptions of target individuals’ characteristics after 
watching a videotape of the target in a mock interview. The question addressed in this 
study was whether accountability and responsibility would serve to reduce errors in person 
perception. Previous research had found that one person’s descriptions of a target 
person’s characteristics are more likely to be a function of the perceiver than the 
perceived; this is evidenced by low agreement across different perceivers of the same 
target (low inteijudge agreement) and high agreement within a perceiver across different 
targets (high intrajudge agreement). It was expected that accountability and responsibility 
would reduce this biased tendency by placing demands on the perceiver which would lead 
to more differentiated descriptions across targets (lower intrajudge agreement) and greater
18
consistency across judges for a given target (higher inteijudge agreement). Accountability 
was defined as having to provide an explanation for or more information about target 
descriptions, versus being virtually anonymous. Responsibility was defined as having to 
give target descriptions that would be used for a real decision, versus being used for 
research purposes.
Participants watched two videos of interviews of graduate school applicants and 
completed a checklist of descriptive characteristics of the applicant. The checklist included 
bipolar adjectives, as well as a ‘neither’ response for each set of descriptors. Then they 
were asked to generate five more psychological characteristics on their own which would 
describe the target, as well as an adjective that would be considered the opposite. 
Accountability was manipulated by informing participants that they would later have to 
discuss their ratings of their perceptions of the target with the psychology department 
selection committee in order to provide the committee with more information. They were 
also told that applicants had access to their ratings and tended to take the opportunity to 
view them. Unaccountable participants were told that the ratings would be kept in strict 
confidence. It is important to note that the accountability instructions in this case did not 
mention that justification per se would be required, only that they may be asked to share 
more information. The degree of responsibility was varied such that participants thought 
their responses would either be used to make a real decision about the current applicant or 
not. High responsibility was induced by telling participants that their ratings would be 
considered along with other information in reaching a decision about the applicant. In the 
low responsibility condition, participants were informed that the decision had already been
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made and that their ratings would be used as an aid to improve the future selection 
process.
Both the checklist responses and the participant-generated characteristics were used 
to determine the intra- and inter-judge agreement. Responses were considered to agree if 
they were in the same direction. There were 30 videotapes altogether and they were 
randomly paired and shown to two participants each. In this way, each participant saw 
two videos and each video was seen by two participants. This gave the researchers an 
opportunity to examine both intrajudge agreement across two targets and inteijudge 
agreement for one target.
Consistent with predictions, high accountability and responsibility produced greater 
inteijudge agreement and lower intrajudge agreement. More specifically, reliable and 
discriminating target descriptions were found for high accountability participants under 
both conditions of responsibility. The authors suggested that accountability, as an 
evaluation pressure, seemed to affect attentional processes, causing participants to pay 
more careful attention to the characteristics of the target. It should be noted that when 
accountability was low, high responsibility did lead to more accurate responses than when 
responsibility was low, but results for these conditions (low accountability-high 
responsibility and low accountability-low responsibility) were not significant. Thus, while 
results were strongest in the condition where both accountability and responsibility were 
high, responsibility itself did not appear to be as strong an influence relative to 
accountability. These results suggest that accountability and, to a lesser extent,
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responsibility serve to increase attentional efforts, making target descriptions more 
accurate and reflective of the target, rather than the perceiver.
Opinion and attitude expression. The next two studies investigated the effects of 
accountability on the expression of attitudes or opinions regarding controversial issues. 
Specifically, Tetlock (1983a) examined the effect of accountability on the complexity of 
people’s thinking about controversial issues. Accountability was manipulated by informing 
participants that they would later have to justify their attitudes on several issues to another 
participant. Two alternate hypotheses regarding the effect that accountability has on the 
way people respond to having to express their opinions or attitudes were tested. It was 
suggested that accountability may motivate individuals to process information in a more 
complex and effortful manner, possibly as a means to prevent themselves from appearing 
to lack good judgment. This increased complexity of thought would be accompanied by 
the adoption of more moderate views, in order to reduce the possibility of sharp 
disagreement. Alternatively, being required to justify a point o f view could lead individuals 
to adopt the viewpoint which they believe would be viewed most favorably or would be 
most easily justified. This would require, of course, that the individual be aware of what 
position would be regarded as most favorable. In this case, accountability would not lead 
to more effortful thinking about the issues, but rather to the low-effort strategy of simply 
expressing the most easily justified response.
In a test of these hypotheses, participants were asked to spend five minutes writing 
down their thoughts on the issues of affirmative action, defense spending, and capital 
punishment and then respond to several attitude measures. These measures were three 7-
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point semantic differential scales to measure the participants’ attitudes toward the issues. 
The anchors were fair-unfair, good-bad, and wise-foolish. Accountability was the only 
independent variable, and there were four conditions. In three of the conditions, 
participants were accountable; that is, they expected to justify the positions they took on 
the attitude response scales to another participant. In one of these conditions, no other 
information about the individual to whom the participant would be accountable was given. 
In the other two conditions, the participants were told that the individual to whom they 
were accountable held either liberal or conservative views toward major social issues.
Note that participants expected to justify only their responses to the attitude scales, not 
their reported thoughts; these were thought to be confidential and not traceable to them 
personally. In the fourth condition, participants were not accountable and they believed all 
of their responses would be confidential and not traceable to them personally.
The thoughts reported by participants were analyzed in terms of integrative 
complexity, which is a measure o f the number of dimensions of a problem considered 
(labeled as differentiation) and the amount of connections made between these dimensions 
(labeled as integration). It is important to note that the degree of integrative complexity is 
not a reflection of the particular position an individual chooses to take, but rather the 
structure of the views. In addition, these thoughts were coded as liberal, conservative, or 
neutral. These codings were used to develop two additional measures, a difference balance 
index and a ratio balance index. The difference index was the difference between the 
number of liberal and conservative thoughts for each participant. The ratio index was the 
ratio of the number of either liberal or conservative thoughts (whichever was more) to the
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total number of thoughts listed. For the difference index, scores close to zero reflected 
high inconsistency in thoughts; for the ratio index, scores close to one indicated high 
consistency in thoughts. Responses to the attitude scales were used as a dependent 
measure and an additional measure was calculated from the attitude scales to assess the 
extremity of attitudes. This was done to address the possibility that accountability causes 
people to take less extreme stances.
Analyses showed that participants who were accountable to an individual of known 
views (a liberal or a conservative) tended to report thoughts and attitudes consistent with 
the individual to whom they believed they were accountable. Contrary to predictions, 
participants accountable to an unknown individual did not report less extreme views than 
unaccountable participants. Although unexpected at the time, these results are consistent 
with what has since been learned about accountability. As previously mentioned (Tetlock, 
1985a), accountability does not appear to alter the views people are willing to express, as 
evidenced by the difference between pre- and post-exposure responses. If  it were to 
operate in this manner; there should be similar responses to accountability demands, 
regardless of when the individual was informed of these demands. Again, this is supportive 
of the suggestion that accountability affects how and what people think and not simply 
what they are willing to say. Other results showed that participants who were accountable 
to an individual of unknown views were found to think in significantly more integratively 
complex ways than participants in all of the other conditions, as indicated by higher ratings 
for level of integrative complexity. T hese accountable participants also had significantly 
lower scores on the difference balance index and on the ratio balance index than
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participants in all other conditions. Both of these results indicate greater inconsistency in 
thoughts.
The contribution of this study is that whereas accountability may lead to increased 
complexity of thinking in some cases, it may lead to less effortful thinking in others. More 
specifically, if people know the views of the individual to whom they are accountable, they 
are likely to respond with less effort, by expressing views which they believe will be seen 
as most favorable. However, when it is not clear what responses are most favorable, 
participants will respond by thinking in a more complex manner by evaluating the issue in 
a more inconsistent and multidimensional manner.
A second study by Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger (1989) replicated and expanded 
upon the previous study. In addition to varying the individual to whom the participant was 
believed to be accountable, the authors also varied the timing of the attitude measures. 
Whereas in the previous"'study the attitude measures were always given after participants 
reported their thoughts on the controversial issues, this study included an additional 
condition in which the attitude measures were completed before the thoughts were written 
down. It was predicted that participants in this condition would react to accountability 
demands by becoming defensive about their previously reported attitudes, since they 
would have already committed themselves to a position. Therefore, integrative complexity 
should be low, because participants would attempt to maintain consistency in their 
reported thoughts as a means of bolstering their position. Recall that consistency would 
represent low differentiation, which is a sign oflow integrative complexity.
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Again participants were asked to list their thoughts and feelings on the issues of 
affirmative action, university tuition, nuclear freeze, and capital punishment and to 
complete a series of attitude scales on the same issues. The scales used were the same as 
those of the previous study, which included three 7-point semantic differential items which 
measured each participant's attitudes toward each policy. Half of the participants reported 
their thoughts first and then completed the attitude measures, the other half did these tasks 
in reverse order. It is important to make clear that all participants, regardless of which task 
they completed first, were informed of their level of accountability prior to the first task. 
Therefore, the timing of the accountability instructions was not manipulated. Participants 
were assigned to one of four conditions of accountability. These were identical to those of 
the previous study; accountable participants expected to justify their responses to the 
attitude measures to another participant who was either a liberal, a conservative, or an 
individual whose views were unknown. Again, note that no participant thought they would 
be accountable for their thoughts. Accountability was imposed only for the attitude 
responses. In the fourth condition, participants were not accountable and believed all of 
their responses were confidential and not traceable to them personally.
The reported thoughts were again analyzed for integrative complexity and results 
were consistent with those of the previous study, for those variables that were repeated. In 
other words, those participants who were accountable to an individual of unknown views 
tended to think in significantly more integratively complex ways than participants in the 
other three conditions of accountability. Also, participants who were accountable to an 
individual of known views tended to report attitudes consistent with these views.
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However, both of these results were found only for participants who reported their 
thoughts first and then completed the attitude measures. Participants who took an 
attitudinal stand first tended to respond by bolstering and becoming more committed to 
their attitudes. This was the case regardless o f whether the participant was accountable to 
a liberal, a conservative, or an individual of unknown views. In other words, having 
committed themselves to particular attitudes, participants did not respond to 
accountability demands by adopting the viewpoints which would be seen as most 
favorable. Instead, they became even more committed to their original stand. These results 
provided evidence of yet another means o f responding to accountability demands.
Judgments and decisions. The last and more pertinent domain of outcome 
accountability has been concerned with judgments and decisions. Adelberg and Batson 
(1978) examined the effects of accountability on the decision to engage in helping 
behavior. Participants were given information about six financial aid applicants and asked 
to make allocation decisions. Accountability and adequacy of resources were varied across 
participants. Accountable participants thought they would be meeting with a staff member 
involved with the project to review their performance or with the applicant to inform them 
of the allocation decision. Resources were either adequate to meet the needs of all six 
applicants or inadequate, such that not everyone’s needs would be met. The measure of 
interest was the allocation effectiveness, which assessed the degree to which effective uses 
of the resources were made. An effective allocation was made if enough money was given 
to an individual to meet their predetermined need. An ineffective allocation was made if 
the amount of money awarded was insufficient to meet an individual’s need. This was
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considered ineffective because without assistance to meet their survival needs, students 
would be forced to drop out of school. Therefore, the help would be ineffective overall.
Results showed that when resources were inadequate, accountability led to more 
ineffective allocation of resources. That is, more money was wasted by allocating an 
insufficient amount to many individuals, instead of allocating a sufficient amount to only a 
few individuals. Here accountability for a decision outcome obviously did not lead to a 
more desirable outcome. It may be, however, that accountability for the process by which 
the decision strategies were made may have produced more desirable outcomes. Analysis 
of the strategies used to make allocation decisions revealed that only the unaccountable 
participants responded with the most efficient allocation strategy, presumably because they 
were not accountable for the outcome. Although it may not immediately follow, it is 
possible that shifting the accountability away from the outcome and towards the process 
may have led to a more'effective process and a more favorable outcome.
In both situations, accountability presumably led to apprehension associated with 
having to justify a response. However, the responses were very different across these 
studies because of the different nature of the tasks. In the studies involving impressions 
and opinions, participants simply had to argue for what they thought. As long as it could 
be seen as defensible, it shouldn’t have mattered what they thought since their opinions 
and impressions did not have any effect on others. Here the response, or decision, of the 
participant was very important to the individual to whom the participant was accountable. 
The financial aid decision could potentially alter the recipient’s life in a drastic way. It 
could be argued that a high degree of responsibility was operating to influence
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participants’ reactions to the accountability demands. According to these results, 
accountability may have the potential to place too much pressure on an individual, causing 
him or her to act in less than effective ways.
A study by Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) examined the effect of accountability on 
the degree of consistency in judgments in a multiple cue probability learning task. In this 
type of task, participants are to learn to use a set of cues to make judgments. This requires 
determining the relationship between the cues and a criterion, and then applying this to 
predict the criterion from the cue. Learning should take place because feedback is given 
regarding the accuracy of judgments. It was hypothesized that participants who would be 
required to justify their judgments would make these judgments with greater consistency 
than those participants not required to justify their judgments, because applying greater 
consistency would make justification easier for these participants.
Participants were given cue values (from 1 to 15) which represented the amount of a 
fictitious substance in a patient’s body. They were then asked to predict the criterion 
(values ranging from 1 to 50), which represented the severity of disease. The researchers 
manipulated outcome predictability (low vs. high), feedback (present vs. absent), and 
accountability (accountable vs. unaccountable). The presence of feedback included 
informing participants of the true criterion value following prediction. When feedback was 
absent, no information was given about the correct answer. The accountability 
manipulation required participants to explain in writing why they chose each particular 
level of criterion. It should be noted that participants actually followed through with the 
justification, whereas in other studies participants only expected to later justify themselves,
28
but never had to do so. The primary dependent variable of interest was the consistency of 
the individual’s judgments, which was represented by the multiple correlation between the 
cues and the participant’s predictions.
Analyses revealed a three-way interaction which showed that accountability led to 
greater consistency in judgment across trials, but only in conditions of no feedback and 
low outcome predictability. The authors suggested that the need to justify affected only 
the low predictability participants because consistency would already be high among the 
high predictability participants, regardless of accountability. In other words, for the high 
predictability conditions, there was no room for accountability to have an effect, because 
consistency was already so high. They also explained that accountability would not lead to 
greater consistency for participants receiving feedback because the feedback would cause 
them to persist in applying new rules, or testing hypotheses about the relationship between 
the cue and criterion. Without feedback, once a rule was chosen, it would be applied 
consistently. For these reasons, the power of accountability to increase the consistency of 
judgments was limited to those conditions in which outcome predictability was low and 
there was no feedback.
Schadewald and Limberg (1992) also studied the effects accountability on judgments, 
except in this case they were judgments regarding the strength of legal arguments. It was 
hypothesized based on previous research that participants who heard an argument which 
followed a natural order of progression and causality would judge that argument to be 
stronger than one which was not presented in such fashion, simply because the former 
would be more easily understood and mentally constructed. However, it was thought that
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accountability would moderate this effect and cause participants to be less susceptible to 
the effects of the information order. This pressure to be accountable would cause 
participants to focus more on the facts presented in the argument, instead of just on the 
sequence of the events.
Participants were presented with one of two tax cases; one described an individual’s 
intentions regarding forming a partnership and the other described intentions for operating 
a kennel. The applicable tax laws were provided and two arguments were given, one 
which argued that the requisite intent existed (affirmative argument) and one which argued 
that it did not exist (negative argument). Participants read the arguments and rated the 
relative strength of the arguments on a 21-point scale, and then gave a dichotomous 
decision about which one was stronger. All participants received competing arguments 
regarding intent, and the order in which the affirmative and negative arguments was 
presented was counterbalanced across all participants. However, the order in which the 
information was presented within the arguments was varied. The facts within the 
arguments were presented either in a causal order or random order. High accountability 
was induced by having participants justify their judgments of the strength of the argument 
in writing. No justification was required of or mentioned to participants who were not 
accountable. In sum, the tax case, information order, and accountability were the 
independent variables.
Results showed that accountability reduced the typical response of choosing the 
argument in which the facts were presented in causal order as the stronger argument. In 
conditions of low accountability, information order was found to have an effect on
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judgment, such that the causal order was seen as stronger than the random order. When 
accountability was high, this effect was no longer present. In other words, neither the 
causal nor the random order of events was seen as a significantly stronger argument than 
the other. A postexperimental questionnaire revealed that participants found those 
arguments presented in causal order to be more coherent and easier to understand. This 
supported the previously mentioned logic that participants would find a causal order of 
events easier to understand. The authors concluded simply that requiring participants to be 
accountable reduces the likelihood that they will be susceptible to thinking that a causally 
ordered argument is easier to follow, and therefore stronger.
Recently, Murphy (1994) examined the effect of accountability on covariation 
judgments. These judgments were somewhat similar to those required of participants that 
judged the criterion of disease from cues, a study discussed earlier (Hagafors & 
Brehmer,1983). However, in this study, the task was different, and it allowed for the 
researchers to examine the strategies used in the judgments. It had been shown in previous 
work that participants performing covariation tasks tended to use very simple strategies, 
resulting in poor assessments. Based on the promising results of much of the work already 
cited, Murphy speculated that accountability might spur participants to use more complex 
strategies in their covariation assessments, if indeed additional effort was all that was 
required.
Participants were given 12 problems, each of which gave values for two crossed 
variables, presented in a 2 X 2 table. The values presented in each of the four cells 
represented the relationship between a fertilizer and the health of a plant. Therefore,
31
fertilizer vs. no fertilizer was crossed with healthy vs. unhealthy. Based on these cell 
values, participants responded to a question regarding the degree of covariation 
demonstrated in each of the problems. The question required the participant to use the 
given values to rate on a 7-point scale whether the plants which received the fertilizer 
would be healthier than, less healthy than, or as healthy as plants which did not receive the 
fertilizer. Only the direction, not the actual value, of the rating was used to determine 
accuracy. Accountable participants were told that they would later be asked to justify their 
judgments (ratings) to the experimenter and that other participants would also ask them 
questions. There was no mention of accountability to the rest of the participants.
The problems were differently structured, and were divided accordingly into four 
groups, depending on the particular strategy that was required to correctly solve them. In 
this way, the number and type of problems solved served as an indicator of the specific 
decision strategies used. For example, if a participant were to correctly solve all of the 
problems, it could be concluded that a decision strategy called the conditional probability 
rule had been applied (since it was required to solve the most complex group of 
problems). It was found that accountable participants showed more complex patterns in 
strategy employment than unaccountable participants. The author concluded that previous 
findings which showed that participants did not apply complex strategies in 
covariation assessment were not the result of an inability to do so. Accountability demands 
resulted in the use of more complex decision strategies.
As can be seen from the above studies, a great deal of support has been generated for 
the proposition that accountability can, under certain circumstances, lead to enhanced
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cognitive processing. The above studies generally required that participants simply justify 
their responses, whether these consisted of impressions, opinions, attitudes, decisions, or 
judgments. Once again, these instructions are most consistent with the notion of 
accountability for an.outcome^ although. they were not labeled as such. Now the focus will 
turn to studies in which the accountability instructions were directed slightly more towards 
a process justification.
Process Accountability
Impression formation. Two studies investigated the effects o f accountability for 
information used to form impressions of others on thought complexity and accuracy of 
impressions. Tetlock and Kim (1987) demonstrated that in the absence of accountability 
demands, participants are quick to draw conclusions about the personality of others, tend 
to base these impressions on limited information, and are overly confident in their 
predictions. The authors suggested, however, that accountability might once again serve 
to reduce these types of biases in a personality prediction task by causing participants to 
think in more integratively complex ways, thereby improving the accuracy of their 
impressions.
Participants read three individuals’ responses to a 16-item personality test and then 
gave a short personality sketch (descriptions of at least three sentences in writing) of each 
person. Then they were asked to predict the other individuals’ responses to an additional 
set of personality items and rate their confidence in the correctness of each prediction. 
Participants were told that the study was concerned with the person-perception process, 
defined as the way people use various types of information to form impressions of others.
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Accountable participants were told that they would be involved in a detailed interview 
with the experimenter to investigate “the types o f information people use to form 
impressions of others.” In addition, the interview would be audiotaped for future analysis. 
Accountability instructions were given either before or after participants had read the test- 
takers’ responses and written the personality sketch. Unaccountable participants were told 
that their impressions would be completely confidential and not traceable to them. The 
written personality sketches were coded by raters for integrative complexity, a measure of 
the degree of differentiation and integration of concepts. The predictive accuracy of the 
item responses and the appropriateness of confidence ratings were also analyzed, both 
through the use of detailed statistical analyses.
Consistent with previous research, preexposure-accountability led to more 
integratively complex and accurate descriptions along with lowered confidence (which 
was more appropriate) in their predictions. However, the accuracy and confidence effects 
were found to still be significant even after controlling for integrative complexity. 
Therefore, accountability appears to have some effect on accuracy and confidence 
independent of its effects on complexity of thought. Tetlock and Kim suggested that 
accountability may not only lead to more analytic thought but may also serve as a “social 
brake on judgmental biases.” As a means of doing this, accountability may cause 
individuals to respond in a manner which disrupts automatic processing. However, it can 
only do this when participants are informed of their accountability before being exposed to 
the information that would normally be processed more automatically. This explains why 
postexposure-accountable participants reacted no differently than unaccountable
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participants. Individuals informed of their accountability after automatic processing only 
have access to the products of their thoughts and therefore cannot correct the process.
Thus far, most of the research which has demonstrated that accountability leads to 
increased complexity of thought has shown positive outcomes of such enhanced 
processing. However, Tetlock and Boettger (1989) have shown that this effect of 
accountability is not always desirable, especially in situations when the information that is 
processed more integratively may not be relevant to the task at hand. Their study 
investigated the influence of accountability on the dilution effect for a person perception 
task. The dilution effect is the tendency for nondiagnostic information to dilute the 
extremity of predictions people make. In other words, when given information that is 
diagnostic (useful to base predictions upon) and information that is nondiagnostic 
(irrelevant to predictions), people normally tend to make predictions that are more 
moderate than when only diagnostic information is given. It was speculated that 
accountability would exacerbate this effect by causing participants to think in more 
complex ways about all the information given, whether it was previously determined to be 
relevant or not.
The following study consisted of two experiments which were identical except for 
the content of the tasks. Participants in the first experiment reviewed a description of a 
student, and participants in the second experiment read a description of a psychotherapy 
patient. In both experiments, participants subsequently wrote their thoughts about their 
impressions of the individuals, made a specific prediction about the individual (GPA for 
the student and likelihood of being a child abuser for the patient), and rated their
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confidence in their prediction. The prediction for the patient required a rating on an 11- 
point scale. It was not clear how many points were on the scale for the confidence ratings. 
All participants were told that the study was concerned with person perception processes 
and that experimenters would look at how people use information to form impressions and 
how those impressions are used to make predictions. Accountable participants were told 
prior to reading any information that they would be interviewed later so that the 
researcher could “explore the types of information used to form impressions of others.” 
Unaccountable participants were told that their impressions would be confidential and not 
traceable to them. In addition to accountability, the direction of the diagnostic evidence 
and the type of evidence were manipulated. The direction of evidence was varied by giving 
participants information that either suggested the student would have a high GPA or a low 
GPA and information that suggested that the patient was either a child abuser or was not. 
The type of evidence was varied such that participants received either a small amount of 
diagnostic information (control condition), diagnostic plus nondiagnostic information 
(dilution condition), larger amounts of diagnostic information (augmented condition), or a 
mixture of diagnostic and counterdiagnostic information (contradictory condition). 
Therefore, in both experiments, the variables of accountability, direction of evidence and 
type of evidence were completely crossed. Integrative complexity, extremity of 
predictions, and the appropriateness of confidence ratings were the dependent measures.
Consistent with predictions, evidence of the dilution effect was shown; participants 
given nondiagnostic information in addition to diagnostic information (dilution condition) 
tended to make less extreme predictions than control participants. In addition,
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accountability exacerbated the dilution effect, such that it was much stronger for 
accountable participants than unaccountable participants. In other words, in the diluted 
condition, participants who were accountable gave a predicted GPA closer to the average 
GPA (participants were told to predict a GPA of 3.0 if they had no useful information on 
which to base predictions) than unaccountable participants
A similar pattern was found for the second experiment; accountable participants in 
the dilution condition predicted a likelihood of being a child abuser that was closer to the 
mean (a rating of 6, which represented no greater or less likelihood than anyone else) than 
unaccountable participants. Relative to unaccountable participants, accountable 
participants also made more extreme judgments in the augmented condition and less 
extreme judgments in the contradictory condition. Consistent with previous research, 
accountable participants were more integratively complex in their thinking and had 
reduced confidence in their predictions relative to unaccountable participants, who tended 
to be overconfident. Integrative complexity was found to be a significant covariate for the 
accountable participants in the dilution condition, but the interaction was still significant 
for the first experiment when complexity was partialed out.
Although this research has highlighted a negative outcome of accountability, it is not 
inconsistent with previous conclusions about the effects of accountability. Because the 
strength of the interaction was reduced by removing the effects of complexity, it is still 
suggested that increased complexity of thought is one of the mechanisms through which 
the dilution effect is exacerbated by accountability. The authors suggested that 
accountable participants thought so complexly about the information that they made great
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efforts to make use of all the information, whether or not it was objectively described by 
others as diagnostic. Remember that less extreme predictions were made by accountable 
participants in the dilution condition, but more extreme predictions were made in the 
augmented condition, where the information was useful to making predictions. Once 
again, it was shown that accountability could not be operating to simply alter what people 
are willing to say, since extremity of judgments varied as a function of the types of 
information available, not as a function of accountability.
Judgments and decisions. Consistent with the previous discussion of outcome 
accountability, this last section concerning process accountability includes those studies in 
which participants were asked to make a judgment or a decision. Early research by 
McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach (1979) focused on people’s selection of decision 
strategies and the effects of accountability, decision significance, and decision reversibility 
on such selection. The study was conducted to provide more information for a model 
previously proposed by two of the authors, Beach and Mitchell (1978). The model 
accounts for strategy selection by applying a cost-benefit analysis to the selection process. 
According to the model, the cost of using a strategy increases as the complexity of the 
strategy increases. However, the possibility of arriving at a correct decision (a benefit) also 
increases as the complexity of the strategy increases. Therefore, in choosing which 
decision strategy to use, the decision-maker is confronted with assessing these costs and 
benefits. In addition, however, other outside factors can enter into the equation. Three 
such factors are accountability, decision significance, and decision reversibility. No
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particular hypotheses were made regarding how these variables would affect decision 
strategy selection.
Three studies were conducted, but the first two manipulated accountability in a 
manner which would be more appropriately labeled here as responsibility. Participants 
were asked to read descriptions of several organizational problems, assume the role of the 
central character, and then choose a decision strategy from four decision strategies 
outlined by the experimenter. In the second experiment, participants again chose a 
decision strategy, but also had to employ the strategy and actually make a decision. In the 
organizational problem, the central character was either personally responsible for the 
decision or his decision would be reviewed by others. Because participants were supposed 
to assume the role of the central character, this variation in the central character’s decision 
responsibility served as the accountability manipulation. As a means of strengthening this 
manipulation, the character was also described as being under a lot or a little pressure 
from his boss. The decision was described as either highly significant or not, and either 
reversible or not.
Because there are no costs associated with simply selecting a strategy, the authors 
devised a system whereby costs were associated with selection so that participants 
couldn’t simply choose the most complex strategy every time. This system allotted 
participants a given number of ‘decision resource units’ (DRUs), which represented the 
amount of time, effort, and analysis required for the use of a particular strategy. Each 
strategy was assigned a number o f DRUs, with more analytic strategies having a higher 
number. In choosing their strategies, participants could not exceed the number of DRUs
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that had been allotted to them. In this way, the authors developed costs associated with 
strategy selection.
Both studies showed main effects for all three variables and no interactions. 
Accountability, decision significance, and decision irreversability all resulted in the choice 
of more highly analytic strategies. These studies appear to be even one step further 
removed from real life than the previously mentioned studies since the task required the 
participant to assume the role of a character in the problem, instead of imposing these 
variables directly on the participant.
The third study accounted for this lack of realism by imposing the problem directly 
on the participant; they were no longer asked to assume the role of the main character in a 
written problem. In addition, accountability was operationalized in a more traditional 
manner; participants expected to defend their decisions to others. The same variables were 
manipulated as in the first two studies, but participants were asked to make true decisions 
that were either part of a long term, important research project or of a small pilot study 
(significance manipulation), could or could not be reversed (reversibility manipulation), 
and that they would either have to defend in front of a small group of their peers or not 
(accountability manipulation).
Results showed main effects for accountability and significance, but not for 
reversibility. Accountability and high significance caused participants to choose more 
highly analytic strategies. The effect of accountability was significant, while the effect of 
decision significance was only marginally significant. It should not, however, be concluded 
that accountability is a stronger variable than significance. The findings are limited to this
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study and the means by which the variables were manipulated and measured. The 
important thing to note, however, is that accountability led to the selection and 
implementation of more complex decision strategies, a result that is wholly consistent with 
research previously discussed.
Arkes, Christensen, Lai, and Blumer (1987) examined the effect of justification on 
participants’ degree of confidence in their judgments of answers to general knowledge 
questions. Justification was manipulated by telling participants that they would have to 
explain some of their answers to a group of other participants. It was thought that having 
to justify a response would reduce the overconfidence that individuals typically have in the 
accuracy of their judgments.
Justification was the only independent variable, and participants in the justification 
condition were told that after completing the questionnaire, they would each be asked to 
explain two of their answers to the rest of the group. No mention of justification was 
made to control participants. Participants were given 35 general knowledge questions, 
each followed by two possible answers. An example of the type of question asked was 
“Which is larger? Great Britain or Greenland?” All participants were asked to answer each 
of the questions and then give an estimate of their confidence in the correctness of their 
response on a 50 to 100% scale. The experimenter gave an example of an answer to a 
question and gave a justification for why she chose her answer. The first five questions 
were then used as practice questions for the experimental group. After everyone answered 
all five, participants were each asked to explain to the group how they decided on a 
particular answer. Participants in the experimental group then answered the remaining 30
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questions and gave their confidence levels. After completion of the questionnaire, 
participants were asked to explain their answers to two randomly chosen questions. The 
dependent measures were accuracy of the answers, confidence level, and the length of 
time in lOths of a minute that participants spent on the questionnaire. In addition, a 
measure of overconfidence was calculated by taking the average confidence level reported 
and subtracting the proportion of the items answered correctly.
Consistent with the hypothesis, participants who had to justify their responses were 
significantly less overconfident in their responses than control participants. However, their 
answers were no more accurate than those who did not have to justify their responses. 
They did, however, take significantly more time to complete the questionnaire than control 
participants. The authors suggested that participants spent more time reviewing the 
possible answers and therefore became less confident in the accuracy of a given response.
It is important to note that decreased overconfidence was not accompanied by 
increased accuracy in this study. It is not clear why this occurred; it may have been due to 
the nature of the questions asked. There simply may not have been much variance in the 
participants’ ability to answer these general knowledge questions in the first place. 
However, it is possible to imagine situations in which increased consideration of multiple 
alternative answers may lead to increased accuracy, especially when the correct answer is 
not obvious. One note of criticism toward this study was the manner in which time on the 
task was measured. Participants were asked to write down the number displayed on a 
clock-counter when they had completed the questionnaire. These instructions were given 
prior to answering any questions, so participants were probably aware that they were
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being timed. This measure may have served as an unintended secondary pressure for all 
participants, and it is not clear in what way it may have altered their accuracy or 
reasoning. However, because this was a constant across all participants, it could not affect 
differences between the experimental and control groups, but it should be kept in mind 
when interpreting the results.
The last study to be discussed is most relevant to the current study because it tested 
the effects of both accountability and responsibility on judgments in a multiattribute 
decision making task. A multiattribute decision making task involves a set of alternatives 
for which qualities along various dimensions must be considered. As in previous studies, 
accountability and responsibility were examined as a potential means of increasing 
cognitive effort and the use of more complex decision strategies. The dependent variables 
were measures of cognitive effort inferred from assessments o f the amount o f information 
searched. Weldon and Gargano (1988) asked participants to evaluate a series of jobs, each 
of which was described on five dimensions. The overall evaluation consisted of rating how 
good each job was on a scale of one to seven with very bad and very good as anchors. 
Accountability was manipulated by asking participants to provide their names and phone 
numbers so that the experimenter could contact them later to learn what information was 
used to make the judgments and why certain judgments were made. Responsibility was 
varied by leading participants to believe that they were either one of 16 evaluators (shared 
responsibility) or that they alone were the only evaluator (sole responsibility). Those who 
believed their evaluations would be combined with others’ thought that their responses 
were anonymous. All participants believed their evaluations would be used by a real
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vocational research organization in making future decisions. Therefore, the decision 
importance was quite high for all conditions.
Weldon and Gargano expected that accountability would moderate the relationship 
between responsibility and effort by reducing the differences typically found between 
conditions of shared and sole responsibility. It has been shown in the past that individuals 
who share responsibility for this same task tend to exert less cognitive effort than 
individuals who feel sole responsibility (Weldon & Gargano, 1985). The authors predicted 
that accountability would eliminate these differences by causing all individuals to exert the 
same amount of cognitive effort, regardless of degree of responsibility. Results revealed an 
interaction of accountability and responsibility on amount of information searched, such 
that judges who worked alone tended to search for more information than participants 
who shared responsibility, except under conditions of accountability. Thus, for this 
dependent variable, accountability reduced the typical cognitive loafing effects that occur 
when individuals' sense of responsibility is diffused. However, there were no significant 
effects of accountability on a measure of the degree of consistency with which information 
was processed. The authors suggested that these results could be due to participants’ 
expectations about what they would have to justify. Since the instructions implied that 
participants would be accountable for which dimensions were used and how they 
influenced judgment, participants were less concerned with consistency in judgment and 
more concerned with what information they were using to arrive at a judgment.
The interpretation offered by Weldon and Gargano (1988) highlights the previously 
overlooked importance of the manner in which accountability is manipulated and the
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potential for what may appear to be subtle differences in instructions to cause significantly 
different results in performance. The effects of accountability may depend on what one 
makes someone accountable for. More specifically, it demonstrates the possible 
differential influence of accountability that emphasizes attention to the processes involved 
in judgment versus attention to simply the outcome of such processes.
Some may suggest that it is perhaps unreasonable to expect a great deal of 
improvement in our abilities to introspect and discern what processes are actually 
occurring. After all, much research has demonstrated that we are very poor assessors of 
our mental activities since we usually only have access to their products. This is true in 
spite of our convictions that we do have such access (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). However, 
the results of many of the previous studies suggest that there may be room for a 
motivational influence such as accountability to increase attention toward the cognitive 
processes which guide performance.
Accountability. Responsibility, and Identifiabilitv
Accountability and responsibility. One of the goals of the present study was to tease 
apart the effects of accountability and responsibility. As mentioned before, accountability 
has, within the bulk of the research, come to mean having to provide an account for or 
justify one’s opinions or position. Responsibility, on the other hand, seems to imply some 
degree of ownership of results or outcomes that is not necessarily implied by 
accountability. This liability for outcomes is likewise not necessarily accompanied by 
justification. Previous research has not made a clear distinction between these variables 
and has sometimes used them interchangeably.
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McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach’s (1979) previously mentioned study had 
participants assume the role of the central character in a written organizational problem. 
The character was described as either personally responsible for the decision or only 
minimally responsible because the decision served as a recommendation to be reviewed by 
others. Participants were not required to justify their chosen strategy, nor was this 
required of the central character, in whose position participants imagined themselves. This 
situation is quite different from the majority of the research, in which accountable 
participants truly believed they would have to verbally justify their behavior to another 
individual. As a means of bolstering the manipulation or intended feelings of 
accountability, an additional component of pressure was added to the problem. The central 
character was described as being under either high or very little pressure from his 
supervisor to make the decision. This additional manipulation serves to complicate the 
issue even further, sincelt is not clear how pressure affects decision strategies. While 
accountability typically leads to more effortful processing, it appears a reasonable 
possibility that pressure could lead individuals to respond in variable ways, depending on 
the kind of pressure (e.g., social, financial, or time) and on individual differences. Some 
people may find pressure to be motivating while others may feel it to be debilitating. These 
issues are equally important but should be tested separately in order to isolate their effects. 
These studies confounded several variables, making it difficult to incorporate the findings 
into the accountability research.
An additional study not previously mentioned examined the effects of accountability 
on training effectiveness (DeMatteo, Dobbins, & Lundby, 1994). Participants went
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through a training session on interviewing skills and subsequently responded to questions 
regarding their reactions and motivation to transfer the training. A test on the content of 
training material was completed as a measure of learning. Participants thought they would 
either participate in a discussion with the experimenter and her assistants, be asked to 
watch a videotape of an interview and critique it, or not have to do anything following 
training. Although results showed that the accountability manipulations led participants to 
learn more and take more notes, this manipulation did not include a true justification. 
Participants were obviously motivated to attend to the training, and this effect of the 
manipulation should not be overlooked. However, the subtle differences between this and 
other accountability manipulations should not be ignored either.
Looking from the opposite perspective, few of the accountability studies reviewed 
earlier involved any degree of responsibility, such that participants were liable for some 
future outcomes resulting from their judgments or decisions. This exclusion does not make 
the results any less revealing and thus should not be viewed as a fault; however, it does 
seem to limit the external generalizability since it is likely that individuals who are in a 
position of defending their views or decisions are typically responsible for the outcomes 
that result from their implementation.
Only two studies previously mentioned led participants to believe their decisions 
would be real and that they would therefore be responsible as well as accountable. The 
first study involved the financial aid allocation decision (Adelberg & Batson, 1978).
Results of this manipulation found negative effects of accountability, but the variables of
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accountability (having to justify the decision) and responsibility (being liable for the 
outcomes) were essentially confounded since participants perceived both to be operating.
The second study (Weldon & Gargano, 1988) crossed accountability and 
responsibility and measured cognitive effort expended in the evaluation of a series of part- 
time jobs. Here participants were either solely or jointly responsible and either accountable 
or not accountable. The only problem with this study is that it served to confound 
identifiability with responsibility. Participants who shared responsibility with others were 
told that their answers, which were entered into a microcomputer, would be immediately 
combined with those of other participants and, therefore, not traceable to the individual. In 
this way, participants who were solely responsible were identifiable and participants who 
shared responsibility were not identifiable. It is not clear how participants who perceived 
their responses to be anonymous could be convinced that they were simultaneously 
accountable and should be prepared to discuss why they responded as they did. In any 
event, it is important that the effects of identifiability be extracted from those of 
responsibility.
Accountability and identifiability. Most of the remaining studies which did not 
include an element of responsibility tended to confound accountability and identifiability. 
Participants who were not accountable were told that their responses were completely 
confidential and therefore not traceable to them personally (Rozelle & Baxter, 1981; 
Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock, 1983b; Tetlock, 1985a; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & 
Kim, 1987; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Although this method is recognized as a 
means to enhance the power of the accountability manipulation, it is also important to
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recognize that these variables are conceptually distinct and should be treated as such, 
despite their potential to co-occur in daily life.
Responsibility and identifiability. Research outside the area of accountability has 
examined the effects of responsibility and identifiability. Much research in the area of 
social psychology has demonstrated what is known as social loafing, or the reduction of 
individual effort when individuals work in groups rather than alone. Latane, Williams, and 
Harkins (1979) asked college students to make noise (clapping or shouting) either alone, 
as part of a true group, or as part of a pseudogroup (participants thought their output 
would be pooled with that of others). Participants who believed their output was shared 
with others did not perform as well as individuals acting alone. In other words, 
participants relaxed their efforts when they thought their output would be shared, and thus 
not identifiable. To follow up on this reasoning, Williams, Harkins, and Latane (1981) first 
replicated the previous experiment with a shouting task and found the same results. The 
authors then included an additional manipulation of identifiability. This variable turned out 
to be quite important; it eliminated social loafing effects when present and led to reduced 
efforts by individuals working alone when removed.
These findings are especially important to keep in mind when interpreting the results 
o f the accountability research. If the removal of identifiability was enough to lead to 
significant differences in performance in the shouting experiment, it is equally possible for 
it to have similar effects in those studies that confounded identifiability with either 
accountability or responsibility.
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This Investigation
Overview of variables. The purpose of this study was to tease apart the effects of 
accountability, responsibility, and identifiability on the quality of the alternatives generated 
to an ill-defined problem. Accountability is defined as whether or not an individual 
provides a justification for a particular response; accountability is further differentiated by 
whether the problem solving process or outcome must be justified. Responsibility is 
defined as the perception that one shares responsibility for a task with others (shared 
responsibility) or whether one is solely responsible for a task (sole responsibility). Lastly, 
identifiability is defined as whether or not an individual perceives his or her responses to 
be identifiable or traceable, versus anonymous. No study to date has systematically 
examined the effects of these three variables on the alternative generation stage of ill- 
defined problem solving. This study defines quality as the resolving power of the 
generated alternatives. Resolving power is the degree to which the solution addresses the 
conflicting aspects of the problem (Upshaw, 1975, cited in Scherer, 1989). The use of 
resolving power as the chosen measure of quality will possibly provide a theoretical 
contribution to the existing line of research on alternative generation conducted by Scherer 
and Billings (1986) and Butler (1995), which has also used this same measure of quality.
In addition, the investigation of the antecedents of resolving power may have practical 
implications for organizations attempting to understand how to maximize the generation 
of alternatives that resolve multiple objectives.
Predictions and rationale. The first objective was to determine whether accountability 
adds any motivational force beyond that produced by high identifiability. Though previous
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work confounded accountability with identifiability, the general assumption of this study is 
that due to the justifiability component o f accountability, accountability still causes a 
greater expenditure of cognitive effort than no accountability, even under conditions of 
high identifiability.
Hypothesis 1: The quality o f the solutions generated will be higher under both 
conditions of accountability (process and outcome) compared to the no 
accountability condition.
The second objective was to tease apart the effects o f accountability for a process 
from the effects of accountability for an outcome on the quality of solutions generated. 
Though it appears that accountability seems to mobilize more cognitive effort, it is not 
clear where and how that effort will be directed. Moreover, no study has revealed whether 
accountability for a process is more or less efficacious in producing high quality solutions 
compared to accountability for an outcome. Recall however, that previous research has 
shown an increase in the quality o f solutions generated as a result o f problem structuring 
techniques, which serve as aids to facilitate the problem solving process (Pitz, Sachs, & 
Heerboth, 1980; Scherer & Billings, 1986). In addition, the work of Herek et al. (1987) in 
their study of international crises served to highlight the potential importance and benefit 
of focusing attention on the problem solving stages as a means of arriving at higher quality 
outcomes. For these reasons, it was proposed that under conditions of high identifiability, 
accountability for a process would result in greater cognitive effort being directed towards 
the problem solving process than accountability for an outcome, which would direct effort
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toward the problem solution. Consequently, efforts directed at the process would be 
reflected by improved quality in the outcome, or solution.
Hypothesis 2: The quality of solutions generated will be higher 
under conditions of process accountability than for outcome 
accountability.
A third goal was to separate the effects of accountability and responsibility on 
solution generation and to determine whether accountability moderates the effects of 
responsibility. As noted before, accountability has often been regarded as having to give a 
justification for something, whereas responsibility has been studied by varying the degree 
of responsibility (shared versus sole). Some studies have used these labels and 
operationalizations interchangeably, making their effects unclear. Whereas it has typically 
been shown that shared responsibility results in reduced levels of effort relative to sole 
responsibility, it was expected that due to both the identifiability and justification 
components of accountability, accountability would serve to moderate the effect of 
responsibility by eliminating the differences in effort across responsibility conditions.
Hypothesis 3: The average of the quality of solutions across both levels of 
responsibility under both levels of accountability will be higher than either shared 
or sole responsibility under no accountability. In addition, solution quality will be 
higher under sole responsibility compared to shared responsibility in the no 
accountability condition.
The final objective of this study was to isolate the effects of responsibility and 
identifiability. It has long been known that when individuals’ outputs are identifiable, they
52
are likely to exert high levels of effort, and when their outputs are not identifiable, they 
consistently exert low levels of effort (Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981). These results 
occur regardless of whether these individuals perceive themselves to be part of a group or 
not. It therefore follows that any attempts to examine the efforts of individuals either as 
part of a group or alone should not overlook the role of identifiability. However, research 
examining the role of responsibility has tended to manipulate this variable by inducing 
participants to believe that they share responsibility with others or are solely responsible 
for their outputs. When responsibility is shared, members’ outputs are usually pooled 
together, thus making their outputs unidentifiable as well. It is therefore speculated that 
much of the reduced efforts resulting from shared responsibility are in fact due to a lack of 
identifiability. For these reasons, it was hypothesized that under conditions of no 
accountability, high identifiability would result in consistent levels of cognitive effort 
across shared and sole responsibility conditions.
Hypothesis 4: The quality of solutions generated will be equal
across conditions of shared and sole responsibility when
identifiability is high; when identifiability is low, sole responsibility will yield
higher quality solutions than shared responsibility.
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Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 296 undergraduates enrolled in_ psychology at the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha. They were volunteers and received extra credit in exchange for their 
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of twelve treatment conditions. 
These twelve conditions were the result of a 3 X 2 X 2 factorial, with accountability 
(process, outcome, or no accountability), responsibility (shared vs. sole), and identifiability 
(high or low) as the independent variables. The average age of the participants was 24, 
and 93 were male and 203 were female. 224 participants were white, 34 were African 
American, 4 were Hispanic, and 34 were of some other ethnic background.
Materials and Task
Participants were presented with a written description of a dilemma regarding 
parking problems at UNO (See Appendix A). This problem was chosen from a series of 
ill-defined problems that were previously tested to identify participants’ reactions to the 
problems (Scherer, Butler, Reiter-Palmon, & Weiss, 1994). This problem was rated as 
high in realism by student participants. For this reason, it was speculated that this problem 
would allow for high believability in the responsibility conditions. In other words, because 
of the nature of the problem, participants would be likely to believe that they were 
responsible for generating solutions that the university might consider.
Design constants. All participants were asked to generate as many solutions as 
possible to the parking problem and to choose one solution which they felt was best. In
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addition, all participants were told that that their solutions would be considered by the 
university in its attempt to resolve the parking dilemma.
Manipulation of Independent Variables
Accountability. The level of accountability was manipulated by the experimenter 
through task instructions. Outcome accountability participants were told that after 
generating solutions and choosing the best solution, they would have to provide 
justification for their choice of best solution, which would later be read by UNO staff 
members. Process accountability participants were told that after generating solutions and 
choosing the best solution, they would have to provide a written justification for each of 
their solutions, which would later be read by a UNO staff members. All accountable 
participants provided written justification according to instructions, following completion 
of solution generation. For unaccountable individuals, no mention of accountability was 
made. /
Responsibility. Participants in the sole responsibility condition were led to believe 
that they alone were responsible for generating solutions to the problem. They were led to 
believe that other participants were solving other problems identified by the university. 
Participants in the shared responsibility condition were led to believe that responsibility for 
generating solutions to the problem was shared with other individuals who were also 
responding to the same problem. A manipulation check measure was taken to ensure that 
participants understood and believed their assigned degree of responsibility.
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Identifiability. Identifiable participants were asked to include their name on all pages 
o f their responses. It was emphasized to unidentifiable participants that their outputs were 
anonymous and therefore not traceable to their identity.
Dependent Measures
Several measures of performance were examined for the generated solutions. 
Quantity o f solutions was calculated by summing the total number of unique, or non­
repeating, solutions generated to the problem for each participant. The quality measures 
were based on resolving power, or the degree to which a solution addressed and resolved 
the conflicting aspects of the problem (Upshaw, 1975). A total of 1800 solutions were 
generated altogether and a reduced set of 832 unique, or non-repeating, solutions was 
derived from the complete set of 1800 solutions. Two raters independently rated each of 
the 1800 solutions as unique or repeating and then met to reach consensus over 
disagreements. This process facilitated and enhanced the reliability of the final resolving 
power rating process by reducing the number of solutions each rater had to read and rate. 
For solutions that were repeating, the raters also determined which unique solutions they 
matched. In addition to creating a reduced set of 832 unique solutions, this process 
ensured that every possible solution was matched to and assigned a unique solution 
number. Ratings of resolving power were then assigned to the reduced set of 832 unique 
solutions by another pair of graduate student judges after a period of training and practice. 
Ratings for resolving power were based on an 6-point scale, ranging from not addressing 
any of the issues in the problem at all to addressing only part of the problem to fully 
addressing all issues of the problem well (Appendix B). This resolving power scale has
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been used in a number of problem-solving studies in the past to assess solution quality 
(e.g., Butler, 1995; Scherer, 1989, Scherer & Billings, 1986). The essential conflict of the 
problem was predetermined, and raters were first asked to decide whether each solution 
resolved one or both facets of the essential conflict. A solution that resolved only one 
facet of the problem was placed in the 1 to 3 rating category, and a solution that resolved 
both facets of the problem was placed in the 4 to 6 rating category. The kappa coefficient 
o f agreement was used to determine the degree of interrater reliability for the rating 
process. The kappa statistic assesses consensus among multiple raters assigning objects to 
categories, and it includes a correction for chance agreement. A kappa of 1 indicates 
complete agreement, and a kappa of 0 indicates no agreement, other than that expected by 
chance. Kappa for this preliminary rating process indicated that the raters’ agreement was 
significantly greater than chance (kappa = .77 ,z =35.09, p < .0001). Raters then made 
independent ratings of each unique solution and assigned the final rating from 1 to 6. 
Discrepancies were resolved through consensus. Again, the raters’ agreement before 
consensus was significantly greater than chance (kappa = .68, z =35.30, p < .0001).
Three indices of the resolving power of solutions were formed: (a) the number of 
solutions generated with high resolving power, with high resolving power indicating a 
solution rated 4 and above on the 6-point resolving power scale, (b) the proportion of 
solutions with high resolving power relative to the total number o f solutions generated, 
and (c) the rating o f the solution with the highest resolving power. These three indices 
were chosen because they each capture a different aspect o f solution quality. The number 
of resolving alternatives simply assesses the number of high quality solutions, whereas the
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proportion of resolving alternatives assesses quality while taking into consideration the 
quantity of solutions generated. The rating of the solution with the highest resolving 
power is a measure of the best solution the participant generated.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the twelve conditions. All participants 
were presented with a written description of the parking problem and the task instructions 
(Appendix C). Participants were also presented with an audio tape of the parking problem 
and instructions. Participants were asked to play the tape on the tape player provided by 
the experimenter and read along as they listened. After they finished reading and listening, 
participants generated a list of alternative solutions to the problem, and then chose the 
solution they felt was best. They were allowed to refer to the problem as often as they 
wished and were given ample paper to respond, so as not to limit the number of solutions.
Participants in the outcome accountability condition were told up front that after 
generating solutions and choosing the best solution, they would have to provide written 
justification for their choice o f best solution, which would later be read by UNO staff 
members. Participants in the process accountability condition were told that after 
generating solutions and choosing the best solution, they would have to provide written 
justification for their list o f solutions and how they arrived at their solutions, to be read 
later by a UNO staff members. No mention of justification was made to unaccountable 
participants.
Participants in the high responsibility condition were told that they alone were 
responsible for generating solutions to the parking problem since no other participants
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were responding to the same problem. Low responsibility participants were told that their 
solutions would be considered along with those of other participants.
Participants in the high identifiability conditions were asked to write their names on 
each page as a reminder that they were identifiable. In addition, identifiable participants 
were given an “identification code” which was written on their scantron sheet. This code 
was mentioned to participants to make their identifiability salient. Participants who were 
not identifiable were told that their responses were anonymous and therefore not traceable 
to them personally. ^
Following completion of the task, participants were administered a manipulation 
check questionnaire to verify that participants understood and believed their assigned 
levels of accountability, responsibility, and identifiability. Participants were then asked to
give brief demographic information and were debriefed regarding the true purpose of the
\
/ .
research. This debriefing included a request to participants to not share any information 
about the study with any other students. Participants were then given extra credit and 
allowed to leave.
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Results
Manipulation Check Results
Because the previously noted hypotheses were of the greatest theoretical importance, 
multiple comparisons were planned to test these hypotheses. However, a number of 
problems occurred which precluded conducting these planned comparisons. Manipulation 
check results indicated that participants either did not believe the manipulation or did not 
answer the manipulation check questions carefully. Participants responded to four 
questions to verify the identifiability and responsibility manipulations embedded in the 
problem instructions. Responses to these questions were inconsistent, indicating that they 
could not be combined to produce reliable indicators of the manipulation effectiveness. 
Manipulation check questions were not used to verify the accountability manipulations 
because the manipulations could be verified by the actual behavior of the participants. 
However, two questions were included to assess the extent to which all participants, 
regardless of accountability condition, mentally justified their solutions as they generated 
them. Analysis of these questions indicated that participants in the no accountability 
condition reported spending significantly more time mentally justifying their solutions than 
participants in the accountability conditions.
In an attempt to most accurately test the premises outlined in this study, 
manipulation check results were used to isolate those participants who reported that they 
believed the manipulations.1 Whereas isolation of participants that answered both 
manipulation check questions in accordance with their condition is most desirable, this 
criterion leads to a severely reduced data set. Therefore, one manipulation check question
1 Analyses conducted with all participants were nonsignificant.
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was chosen as an indicator of the effectiveness of each independent variable manipulation. 
Because it was speculated that participants may not have understood some of the words in 
the questions, items were chosen that were most clearly written and most closely 
resembled the manipulation instructions. Items number 1,3, and 6 were chosen (Appendix 
D). For the identifiability manipulation, the item read, "The solutions and responses I have 
provided can be traced to me personally.” For the responsibility manipulation, the item 
read, “The solutions and responses I have provided will be combined with solutions 
provided by other students, to be reviewed by the university.” This item was reverse 
coded. To assess the accountability manipulation, the item read, “In generating solutions, I 
thought about whether or not my solutions could be defended as good solutions.” 
Unfortunately, no items were given that discriminated between outcome and process 
accountability. Therefore, this question could only be used to determine whether 
significant differences inthe amount of mental justification existed between accountable 
and unaccountable participants. For all items, participants responded on a 10-item scale (0 
to 9), and higher numbers indicated greater perceived identifiability, responsibility, and 
accountability.
Isolated for analyses were the participants who responded to question 1,3, and 6 of 
the manipulation check questionnaire in a direction consistent with their assigned 
condition (as determined by the midpoint of the scale). For example, participants assigned 
to the low identifiability condition who responded to question 1 with an answer less than 
or equal to 4 were retained in the low identifiability condition. Table 1 shows the 
breakdown of these results. For identifiability analyses, 180 participants remained (low
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Table 1
Manipulation Check Results
Variable n M SD df t
Identifiability3 178 31.45*
Low identifiability 111 1.19 1.14
High identifiability 69 7.19 1.40
Responsibility5 130 23.97*
Shared responsibility 73 1.88 1.44
Sole responsibility 59 8.03 1.50
Accountability0 157 26.93*
No accountability 38 1.13 1.65
High accountability 
(Outcome/Process)
121 7.73 1.20
Note. Higher mean scores indicate greater perceived identifiability, responsibility, and 
accountability.
3 Item 1 was used for the identifiability manipulation check 
b Item 3 (reverse coded) was used for the responsibility manipulation check 
° Item 6 was used for the accountability manipulation check 
* P <  .001
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identifiability, n = 111; high identifiability, n = 69). For responsibility analyses, 132 
participants remained (shared responsibility, n = 73; sole responsibility, n = 59), and for 
accountability analyses, 159 participants were included (no accountability, n = 38; 
outcome accountability, n = 58; process accountability, n = 63). Again, no manipulation 
check questions were included to discriminate between the two types of high 
accountability, process and outcome, because participants were actually held accountable 
for their problem solving process (process accountability) or their problem solving 
outcome (outcome accountability).
After this data reduction, manipulation check results indicated significant differences 
across conditions for each of the independent variables. Table 1 also includes these results. 
Because significant differences in perceived identifiability, responsibility, and 
accountability were present, subsequent analyses including the dependent variables of 
interest were finally warranted.
Overview of Analyses Performed
Whereas the data reduction was necessary in order to only analyze information from 
participants who understood and believed the manipulations, this reduction precluded 
many of the planned comparisons due to the creation of cells with very few participants. 
Recall that most of the comparisons were chosen to assess interaction effects. For 
example, one contrast called for testing the differences between shared and sole 
responsibility under conditions of no accountability. Only 38 participants were retained in 
the no accountability condition, and the number of participants from this group that were 
also retained for the responsibility analyses was extremely low. Though there was
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theoretical justification for the planned comparisons, such interaction analyses were 
virtually impossible to do. To prevent losing important information about the independent 
effects of identifiability, responsibility, and accountability on problem solving, omnibus F 
tests were performed on the remaining participants’ data.
Because the reduced data resulted in unequal cell sizes, an alternate means of 
partitioning the sums of squares, known as analysis of unique sources, was used. 
According to Keppel (1991), this method uses a multiple regression approach to calculate 
sums of squares that reflect only the variability that is uniquely associated with a particular 
main effect or interaction. As a result, the sums of the various components will not add up 
to the total sums of squares, unless the design is balanced. Whereas this property of 
uniqueness is present in designs with equal cell sizes, it is not automatically present in 
unbalanced designs. This analysis of unique sources method of partitioning the sums of 
squares can be performed through the univariate MANOVA command in SPSS.
Univariate analyses of variance were conducted for each of the four dependent 
measures, (a) quantity of solutions, (b) the number of solutions generated with high 
resolving power, with high resolving power indicating a solution rated 4 and above on the 
6-point resolving power scale, (c) the proportion of solutions with high resolving power 
relative to the total number of solutions generated, and (d) the rating of the solution with 
the highest resolving power. Table 2 includes the results of correlational analyses among 
these four outcome variables, Separate univariate analyses were conducted for each of the 
main and interaction effects, in order to retain the maximum amount of data. Note that 
different samples were used for these separate analyses, given that more data were
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Table 2
Correlations Among Outcome Variables
1 2 3 4
1. Quantity of solutions —
2. Number of Resolving Solutions .64** —
3. Proportion of resolving 
solutions
.53** —
4. Best Solution .26** .55** .56** —
Note. N=270; includes all participants who were retained for any analysis. 
*p < .05 **p<.01
65
retained for the analyses of main effects. Tests of the interactions also included secondary 
sets of main effects analyses (with smaller n’s) that were not interpreted. The results of 
these additional main effects analyses can be found in Appendix E. Tests for three-way 
interactions were impossible due to multiple cells containing one data point (See Appendix 
F for cell sizes). An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.
Quantity of Solutions
Tests of the assumptions of analysis of variance revealed that heterogeneity of 
variance was present for many solution quantity analyses (e.g., Bartlett-Box F = 20.42, p 
< .0001, for responsibility). An outlier (z = 8.98) was discovered that appeared to be 
creating significant differences in variability across a number of conditions. Cases with 
standardized scores in excess of 3.0 are regarded as potential outliers (Stevens, 1996; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). Whereas the presence of multiple outliers may call for 
transformation of the data to change the shape of the distribution from a skewed to a more 
normal distribution, the presence of a single outlier does not require such transformations 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). The deviant data point was removed and subsequent tests of 
the homogeneity assumption revealed that all heterogeneity was removed (e.g., Bartlett- 
Box F = 01, p = 91, for responsibility). Despite the removal of this outlier, no significant 
effects were found for solution quantity. Table 3 includes the results of the analyses of 
variance for solution quantity. Because each analysis includes different data, Tables 4 and 
5 show the different means and standard deviations for the interaction analyses.
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance Results for Quantity of Solutions as a Function of Identifiability
Responsibility, and Accountability
Source n ss df MS F B
1. Identifiability 178 2.60 1 2.60 .41 .52
2. Responsibility 131 .70 1 .70 .13 .72
3. Accountability 159 11.92 2 5.96 .98 .38
4. Identifiability X 
Responsibility
77 2.48 1 2.48 .47 .49
5. Identifiability X 
Accountability
90 24.09 2 12.04 2.05 .14
6. Responsibility X 
Accountability
72 4.50 2 2.25 .35 .71
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Table 4
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Quantity of Solutions
Identifiability 
Low High
n M SDn M SD
Responsibility
Shared Respty 22 4.55 2.06
Sole Respty 22 4.82 2.32
Accountability
No Accountability 10 4.40 2.07
Outcome Accountability 23 4.78 2.17
Process Accountability 21 5.10 2.57
20 4.30 2.08
13 5.31 2.84
7 3.14 2.80
9 6.33 2.50
20 4.65 2.54
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Table 5
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Quantity of Solutions
Accountability n
Shared
M
Responsibility 
SD n
Sole
M SD
No Accountability 7 4.43 2.23 11 4.46 2.54
Outcome Accountability 16 5.19 2.69 10 6.10 2.23
Process Accountability 19 4.42 2.36 9 5.78 3.03
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Number of Resolving Solutions
Heterogeneity of variance was once again revealed for many analyses for the 
number of resolving solutions. The same outlier that was previously removed for the 
solution quantity analyses was once again removed. All subsequent tests for the 
homogeneity of variance assumption were not significant, and it was therefore decided 
that there could be confidence in the results. Responsibility exerted a main effect on the 
number of resolving solutions, F (l,130) = 4.31 .05. Contrary to predictions,
participants in the shared responsibility condition (M = 2.32, SD = 1.53) generated more 
highly resolving solutions than participants in the sole responsibility condition (M = 1.79, 
SD = 1.30). Table 6 includes a summary of the analyses of variance results, and Tables 7 
and 8 show the means and standard deviations for the interaction analyses.
Proportion of Resolving Alternatives
Tests of the assumptions revealed that homogeneity of variance was present for all 
analyses for the proportion of resolving alternatives. One main effect and one interaction 
effect were found for proportion of resolving alternatives. Responsibility exerted a main 
effect on proportion of resolving alternatives, F (1, 130) = 4.85, p < .05. Contrary to 
predictions, participants in the shared responsibility condition (M = .50, SD = .27) 
generated a higher proportion of resolving alternatives than participants in the sole 
responsibility condition (M = .40, SD = .28). A significant interaction between 
identifiability and accountability was also found, F (2, 85)) = 4.61, p < .05. Simple effects 
tests revealed significant differences between levels of accountability under high 
identifiability, F (2, 85) =3.70, p < .05. Post-hoc comparisons using the Duncan test
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance Results for Number of Resolving Alternatives as a Function of
Accountability. Responsibility, and Identifiability
Source n ss df MS F 2
1. Identifiability 178 .00 1 .00 .00 .99
2. Responsibility 131 8.81 1 8.81 4.31 .04
3. Accountability 158 2.64 2 1.32 .63 .54
4. Identifiability X 
Responsibility
77 .47 1 .47 .20 .65
5. Identifiability X 
Accountability
90 .30 2 .15 .09 .91
6. Responsibility X 
Accountability
72 1.72 2 .86 .40 .67
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Table 7
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Resolving Alternatives
Identifiability 
Low High
n M SD n M  SD
Responsibility
Shared Respty 22 2.32
SoleRespty 22 1.77
Accountability
No Accountability 10 1.90
Outcome Accountability 23 2.09
Process Accountability 21 1.62
1.49 20 2.15 1.73
1.45 13 1.92 1.26
1.37 7 2.29 1.38
1.04 9 2.78 1.40
1.47 37 2.22 1.27
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Table 8
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Resolving Alternatives
Responsibility 
Shared Sole
Accountability n M SD n M m
No Accountability 7 1.86 .90 11 2.00 1.55
Outcome Accountability 16 2.94 1.65 10 2.30 1.34
Process Accountability 19 2.32 1.34 9 1.78 1.79
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revealed that highly identifiable but unaccountable participants (M = .87, SD =.23) 
generated a higher proportion of resolving solutions than highly identifiable participants in 
either outcome or process accountability conditions (M = .46, SD = 30; M = -60, SD 
=.29, respectively). No other significant effects were found for proportion of resolving 
alternatives. Table 9 includes a summary of the analyses of variance results and Tables 10 
and 11 show the means and standard deviations for the interaction analyses.
Best Solution
Tests of the assumption of homogeneity of variance revealed that significant 
heterogeneity of variance was present for the identifiability and accountability interaction 
(Bartlett-Box F =3.06, p <01). However, because heterogeneity of variance increases the 
likelihood of type I error (Keppel, 1991) and this interaction effect was not significant, no 
changes were made to attempt to eliminate this instance of heterogeneity of variance. A 
main effect was found for accountability on best solution, F (2,155) = 11.77, p <05. 
Contrary to predictions, post-hoc comparisons using the Duncan test revealed that 
unaccountable participants (M = 4.61, SD =1.15) and outcome accountability participants 
(M = 4.52, SD =1.08) each generated higher quality best solutions than participants in the 
process accountability condition (M = 4.0, SD =1.38). No other effects were significant 
for the best solution index of solution quality. Table 12 includes a summary of the analyses 
of variance results and Tables 13 and 14 show the means and standard deviations for the 
interaction analyses.
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Table 9
Analysis of Variance Results for Proportion of Resolving Solutions as a Function of
Accountability. Responsibility, and Identifiability
Source n ss df MS F B
1. Identifiability 179 .11 1 .11 1.30 .26
2. Responsibility 132 .36 1 .36 4.85 .03
3. Accountability 159 .10 2 .10 .62 .54
4. Identifiability X 
Responsibility
78 .00 1 .00 .00 .97
5. Identifiability X 
Accountability
91 .67 2 .33 4.61 .01
6 . Responsibility X 
Accountability
73 .18 2 .09 .97 .39
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Table 10
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Proportion of Resolving Solutions
Identifiability 
Low High
n M SD n M SD
Responsibility
Shared Respty 22 .49 .20 20 .54 .35
Sole Respty 23 .39 .27 13 .43 .30
Accountability
No Accountability 11 .42 .23 7 .87 .23
Outcome Accountability 23 .50 .27 9 .46 .30
Process Accountability 21 .33 .27 20 .59 .29
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Table 11
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Proportion of Resolving Solutions
Responsibility 
Shared Sole
Accountability n M SD n M SD
No Accountability 7 .46 .25 12 .49 .36
Outcome Accountability 16 .60 .31 10 .38 .24
Process Accountability 19 .54 .26 9 .36 .37
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Table 12
Analysis of Variance Results for Best Solution as a Function of Accountability. 
Responsibility, and Identifiability
Source n SS df MS F E
1. Identifiability 179 .60 1 .60 .37 .55
2. Responsibility 132 4.31 1 4.31 2.60 .11
3. Accountability 159 11.77 2 5.89 3.93 .02
4. Identifiability X 
Responsibility
78 .28 1 .28 .17 .68
5. Identifiability X 
Accountability
91 2.89 2 1.45 1.24 .29
6 . Responsibility X 
Accountability
73 1.77 2 .89 .59 .56
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Table 13
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Best Solution
n M SD
Responsibility
Shared Respty 22 4.27 1.39
Sole Respty 23 3.78 1.41
Accountability
No Accountability 11 4.54 1.24
Outcome Accountability 23 4.65 .71
Process Accountability 21 3.71 1.49
Identifiability 
Low High
n M  SD
20 4.55 1.05
13 4.31 1.18
7 5.43 .54
9 4.67 1.12
20 4.50 .95
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Table 14
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Best Solution
Responsibility 
Shared Sole
Accountability n M SD n M SD
No Accountability 7 4.86 .38 12 4.42 1.44
Outcome Accountability 16 4.63 1.26 10 4.50 .97
Process Accountability 19 4.11 1.33 9 3.22 1.30
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Exploration of Low F Values
In theory, F values should be equal to 1 when there are no effects and should never be 
less than 1. However, a number of F values were calculated that were less than 1, 
suggesting a potential inadequacy in the underlying model being used to represent the data 
(Shine, 1982). Shine recommends testing the significance of such left-tailed F-ratios by 
taking their reciprocals and reversing the degrees of freedom. The central F distribution 
can then be used to test the significance of these values in the normal manner. All analyses 
resulted in a critical values of F754 o f 253, for identifiability and responsibility analyses or 
F 100,2 of 19.49, for accountability analyses. The reciprocals of these values are .004 and 
.05. Thus, any calculated F values which are below these critical values should be 
questioned. Of the 16 results with F’s less than one, two were statistically significantly less 
than 1: (a) the effect of identifiability on the number of resolving alternatives, and (b) the 
effect of identifiability and responsibility on the proportion of resolving solutions. In these 
two cases, it may be that some other unknown factor is operating to create effects that, 
when unmeasured, are relegated to the error term. Thus, the null results obtained for these 
two analyses are particularly suspect.
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Discussion
Overview
The primary goal of this thesis was to explain solution quality for an ill-defined 
problem as a function of three motivational variables: identifiability, responsibility, and 
accountability. The basic assumption is that these variables will cause people to work 
harder than they might otherwise work. This extra effort was expected to translate into 
enhanced performance in the form of higher solution quality. More specifically, this study 
was designed to tease apart the independent effects o f these three motivational variables as 
well as examine how they act together to jointly affect the amount o f effort a person is 
willing to put forth toward the task of solution generation.
The following discussion will begin with a reminder of the methodological limitations 
and cautions for interpretation, followed by a summary of the findings, both predicted and 
unexpected. Some potential interpretations of the findings will be offered, along with 
limitations for theoretical and applied generalizability. Lastly, implications for theory and 
practice as well as suggestions for future research are offered.
Methodological Limitations
The most important methodological constraint is that a large amount of data was 
lost in an attempt to most accurately test the premises outlined in this study. The 
manipulation check questions designed to assess the effectiveness of the manipulations 
were not answered reliably, making it difficult to determine whether participants really 
experienced their assigned conditions. One manipulation check question was chosen as an 
indicator of the effectiveness of each independent variable manipulation, and participants
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who reported that they believed the manipulation were isolated for analysis. In other 
words, participants who, though exposed to a particular manipulation, did not report belief 
in that manipulation were excluded from analyses for that variable. It is possible that 
different manipulation check questions may have isolated a different group of participants, 
for which different results may have been found.
In addition to the concern about which participants were removed from analyses, it is 
also important to address the number of participants removed from analyses. Chi-square 
tests revealed that significant differences in participant loss existed for tests of each of the 
main effects (X2 =13.79, p <.001; X2 =4.12, p <.05; X2 =8.12, p <.05, for identifiability, 
responsibility, and accountability, respectively). These results suggest that subject loss may 
not have occurred randomly for these tests, and thus, the advantage of random assignment 
may have been eliminated. Chi-square tests for participant loss for tests o f the interactions 
were not significant, suggesting that there was no differential loss of data in these 
conditions. Whereas random assignment may have been protected for the interaction 
analyses, the absolute loss of data was such that the resulting cell sizes were relatively 
small. The small sample sizes may have reduced the power of the experiment to detect 
significant differences. However, significant results that occurred in spite of these power 
limitations should be interpreted as relatively trustworthy, provided it can be concluded 
that the appropriate participants were retained for analysis.
Despite the methodological limitations imposed by the data loss, the manipulations 
used in this study are largely consistent with other research on identifiability, 
responsibility, and accountability. However, the manipulations used here were free from
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the confounds that are often present in many other studies on these variables and may 
serve to clear up some of the confusion surrounding results in this domain. In addition, the 
operationalization of process and outcome accountability was new and may serve to 
expand the research on accountability. Because this operationalization of accountability is 
new and very specific, generalizability is therefore limited to the process and outcome of 
solution generation only. Other means of measuring processes and outcomes should be 
distinguished from the methods used here.
In general, the hypotheses were unsupported, and a number of unexpected results 
occurred. These methodological constraints notwithstanding, the results which follow may 
represent real differences in the effects of the levels of identifiability, responsibility, and 
accountability in the solution generation context.
Summary of Results for Predictions
Effect of accountability on solution quality. Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted a main 
effect of accountability on solution quality with accountability (both process and outcome) 
leading to higher solution quality than no accountability and with process accountability 
leading to higher solution quality than outcome accountability. The logic is that 
accountability leads to more effortful cognitive processing and will therefore result in 
higher solution quality than no accountability. In addition, if the quality of the solutions 
from which individuals must choose is high, then the probability of a chosen alternative 
being a good one increases. Therefore, one would predict that making participants 
accountable for their solution generation process will result in higher quality solutions than 
making participants accountable for their solution generation outcome. The predictions
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described in Hypotheses 1 and 2 required planned comparison analyses. However, recall 
that due to the loss of data, omnibus F-tests were conducted instead. Hypotheses 1 and 2 
were not supported for any measures of solution quality.
Effect of responsibility and accountability on solution quality. Hypothesis 3 
predicted an interaction between responsibility and accountability, with participants in 
both levels of responsibility under high accountability generating higher quality solutions 
than participants in either shared or sole responsibility conditions under no accountability. 
In addition, hypothesis 3 predicted that under no accountability, solution quality would be 
higher under sole responsibility than shared responsibility under no accountability. 
Unfortunately, the reduction in data precluded significance testing o f these specific 
planned comparisons. However, the implication of these hypotheses from an omnibus F 
approach is that that although it has been typically shown that shared responsibility results 
in reduced levels of effort relative to sole responsibility, it was expected that accountability 
would serve to moderate the effect of responsibility on solution quality by eliminating the 
differences in effort across responsibility conditions. No significant interactions between 
responsibility and accountability were revealed as a result of omnibus F-tests. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported for any solution quality measures.
Effect of identifiability and responsibility on solution quality. Hypothesis 4 predicted 
an interaction between identifiability and responsibility, such that under low identifiability, 
sole responsibility would yield higher quality solutions than shared responsibility. Under 
high identifiability, these differences would be eliminated and solution quality would not
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differ across conditions of shared and sole responsibility. Hypothesis 4 was testable, but 
not supported for any of the solution quality measures.
Summary of Unexpected Findings
Effect o f accountability on best solution. A significant main effect of accountability 
on the quality of the best solution was found. Recall that a main effect of accountability 
was predicted by Hypotheses 1 and 2, which predicted that accountability (process and 
outcome) would lead to higher quality than no accountability. In addition, process 
accountability was predicted to lead to higher quality than outcome accountability. 
Contrary to these predictions, unaccountable participants and outcome accountability 
participants each generated higher quality best solutions than participants in the process 
accountability condition. Because the comparisons were aposteriori, the complex contrast 
between accountable (process and outcome combined) and unaccountable participants 
could not be tested. x
Effect of responsibility on solution quality. Although specific hypotheses regarding 
the main effects o f responsibility were not made, the predicted effects of responsibility on 
solution quality were nonetheless implicit. Recall that previous research in social 
psychology has generally shown that when individuals perceive themselves to be part of a 
group, they reduce the amount o f effort they expend, relative to individuals who are solely 
responsible. A hypothesis based on this previous research would predict that participants 
in the sole responsibility condition would generate higher quality problem solutions than 
participants in the shared responsibility condition, as a reflection of the reduced effort 
exhibited by shared responsibility participants.
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A significant difference between sole and shared responsibility was found for both the 
number and proportion of resolving alternatives. However, contrary to predictions, 
participants in the shared responsibility condition generated a higher number of resolving 
alternatives and a greater proportion of resolving alternatives than participants in the sole 
responsibility condition.
Although a few hypotheses contained predictions that shared and sole responsibility 
performance would be equal as a function of an interaction, never was there a prediction 
that included higher performance among participants who shared responsibility relative to 
those who were solely responsible. It is worth noting that examination of the means for 
the nonsignificant interaction of responsibility and accountability suggest that this main 
effect of responsibility may be driven by differences in responsibility among high 
accountability (both process and outcome) participants only. Clearly, this is a matter of 
speculation based on observance of the means. This possibility nonetheless offers insights 
for future research.
Effect of identifiability and accountability on proportion of resolving alternatives. As 
was the case for the main effect of responsibility, no specific hypotheses were made 
regarding the joint effects of identifiability and accountability on solution quality. No 
previous work has assessed the combined effects of identifiability and accountability on 
any variable; rather, most work has confounded the two variables by making 
unaccountable participants anonymous and accountable participants identifiable. This 
study was designed, in part, to tease apart the effects of these two variables.
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The predicted effect of accountability on solution quality has already been discussed. 
Previous work on identifiability and solution generation has shown that when individual 
outputs are identifiable, people generate more high quality solutions than individuals 
whose solutions are unidentifiable (Scherer, 1985). Again, no specific predictions were 
made about the joint effects o f these two variables.
A significant interaction was found between identifiability and accountability for 
proportion of resolving alternatives. Under low identifiability conditions, there was no 
effect of accountability on solution quality. However, under high identifiability, 
unaccountable participants generated a higher proportion of resolving solutions than 
participants in either outcome or process accountability conditions.
Interpretation of Findings
Effect of accountability on solution quality. Recall that accountability had an 
unexpected effect on the quality o f the best solution, such that unaccountable participants 
and outcome accountability participants each generated higher quality best solutions than 
participants in the process accountability participants. Recall also that all participants were 
asked to generate as many solutions as possible to the problem and to choose the solution 
they felt was best. Outcome accountability participants were asked to provide a written 
justification for why they thought the chosen solution was the best one. Although no 
mention of justification was made to unaccountable participants, both unaccountable and 
outcome accountability participants received instructions which suggested that the ‘best 
solution* was the most important criterion. Process accountability participants, however, 
were asked to provide a written justification for each of their solutions. These participants
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received instructions which indicated that all of the solutions served as important criteria. 
Thus, unaccountable and outcome accountability participants received instructions 
suggesting one single criterion, whereas process accountability received instructions 
suggesting multiple criteria.
These differences in instructions may appear to be very subtle. However, evidence 
from previous research suggests that subtle details in accountability instructions may have 
the potential to alter behavior in significant ways. Weldon and Gargano (1988) told 
accountable participants that they would be contacted to share what information they used 
to make their judgments in a multiattribute decision making task and why they used this 
information. Results showed that accountability increased the amount of information 
searched, but not the consistency with which the information was processed, both of 
which are indicators of cognitive effort. As was previously discussed, the authors 
speculated that because the instructions implied that participants would be accountable for 
which dimensions they used and how the dimensions influenced judgment, participants 
may have been less concerned with consistency in judgment and more concerned with 
what information they used to arrive at a judgment.
In the same vein, it is speculated here that because unaccountable and outcome 
accountability participants were instructed to focus on their choice of best solution, they 
were more likely to focus on the quality of one solution than process accountability 
participants, who were asked to focus on every solution they could generate. For process 
accountability participants, a cognitive resource limitation may have been operating to 
cause participants to diffuse effort across the entire solution set. The end result of this
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cognitive resource deficit is that no one solution received concentrated attention or effort. 
Contrary to process accountability participants, unaccountable and outcome accountability 
participants were not operating under cognitive resource limitations and were able to 
generate higher quality best solutions than process accountability participants.
Effect of responsibility on solution quality. The majority of previous research on 
responsibility has shown that people who are solely responsible tend to perform better 
than people who share responsibility with others. Such performance differences are 
explained by the fact that people who share responsibility tend to reduce the amount of 
effort they exert. This study found that people who believed they shared responsibility for 
solution generation performed better than people who believed they were solely 
responsible for solution generation. Two other studies found similar effects that might 
shed light on the question of why shared responsibility may lead to enhanced performance 
over sole responsibility:^
In a series of experiments on the effects o f various types of responsibility and 
identifiability on recall in a decision making task, Price (1987) similarly identified a 
situation in which shared responsibility participants recalled more information concerning 
a decision they made correctly than sole responsibility participants. However, this effect 
was only evident for unidentifiable participants. Similar to the current study, the 
participants’ responses to the decision task were actually going to be used, making the 
task meaningful to participants. Price suggested that in the absence of identifiability, 
participants in the sole responsibility group decreased their efforts. Because participants in 
shared responsibility groups are accustomed to at least some amount of anonymity, the
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lack of identifiability did not alter performance. In addition, it was suggested that 
participants who shared responsibility with others may have felt a sense of responsibility to 
the other groups members to work hard to achieve their assigned goal.
It is important to note that whereas the participants’ decisions were pooled, each 
decision was important because the decisions were tallied to result in a majority vote 
decision. Unlike many group efforts where individual inputs may have reduced impact, 
every individual in this study made a unique contribution to the final outcome. Research 
previous and subsequent to Price’s (1987) study suggests that when participants do not 
believe that their contribution represents unique input, they reduce their efforts (Harkins & 
Petty, 1982; Weldon & Mustari, 1988). Weldon and Mustari suggest that degree of felt 
dispensability may account for cognitive loafing in shared responsibility situations. 
Participants who shared responsibility for a multiattribute judgment task exerted less effort 
and felt more dispensable than participants working alone. Furthermore, Harkins and Petty 
indicate that this degree of perceived dispensability can be reduced for difficult or 
challenging tasks, toward which participants are more likely to feel they can make a 
unique contribution.
Together these studies suggest that when participants feel they are making a unique 
contribution, they may work hard in spite of anonymity or shared responsibility. However, 
this logic would predict that when all participants feel their contributions are unique, either 
because individual or collective output influences the outcome or because the task is 
challenging, there will be no differences between sole and shared responsibility.
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A study by Harkins and Jackson (1985) provides one more piece of the puzzle to 
explain why shared responsibility might lead to better performance than sole responsibility. 
Harkins and Jackson discovered that when participants believed their own performance on 
a brainstorming task could be directly compared with others’ performance, they were 
likely to generate more uses for an object than participants who believed they were the 
only ones working on that specific object. Comparability was manipulated by telling 
participants that the object for which they would be generating uses was the same as or 
different from objects given to other participants. Furthermore, all participants were told 
that the number of uses they generated was comparable only to the number generated by 
others working on the same object. In other words, it was made salient that comparability 
was only possible for those working on the same object.
In the current study, responsibility was confounded with comparability, as defined by 
Harkins and Jackson. Participants who shared responsibility believed their responses 
would be pooled with responses of others working on the same problem. Participants who 
were solely responsible believed other participants were working on a different problem. 
Given the results discovered by Harkins and Jackson, it is possible that the perception that 
a person’s solutions could be compared with others may have compelled participants in 
the shared responsibility condition to outperform participants working alone.
Effect of identifiability and accountability on solution quality. The interaction 
between identifiability and accountability for proportion of resolving alternatives revealed 
that highly identifiable but unaccountable participants generated a higher proportion of 
resolving solutions than highly identifiable participants in either outcome or process
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accountability conditions. A number o f points are important here. The first point worth 
highlighting is that accountability had no effect in the absence of identifiability. Recall that 
almost all previous accountability research has confounded identifiability and 
accountability. Therefore, any significant effects of accountability have been the result of a 
manipulation that contained both identifiability and justification components. This study 
assessed the independent effects of identifiability and justification, and the results suggest 
that identifiability is in fact an important, yet often overlooked, component of 
accountability. Justification in the absence of identifiability failed to influence the overall 
solution set quality in a significant way.
The second important conclusion from these results is that, contrary to much 
previous research on accountability, people who are accountable may have poorer 
performance than people who are not accountable. Only on a few occasions has this effect 
been shown before. Given that accountability has a tendency to cause people to be more 
vigilant information processors, it may be that accountable participants attempted to use 
all of the information presented in the problem to generate solutions. The problem 
(Appendix A) describes the difficulty associated with finding a parking spot on campus, 
especially in the morning hours when a lot of students attend classes. In addition to 
describing the main constraints of maintaining good community relations, operating within 
the university budget, and allowing the students to get to class in a timely and hassle-free 
manner, the problem also includes a rather lengthy discussion about the possibility of 
building an access road through the park to ease traffic congestion. Given the essential 
conflict just discussed, this information does not seem particularly useful or relevant to
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creating more available parking spots. Previous research has shown that when 
accountability is introduced, people tend to think in more integratively complex ways 
about irrelevant information as well as relevant information (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). 
Attempts to integrate this information about building a road may have led accountable 
participants to generate some solutions that focused on this aspect of the problem, even 
though the option of building a road was not important information for successfully 
solving the problem. A consistent tendency for accountable participants to generate 
solutions based on irrelevant information may have led to a decreased proportion of 
resolving alternatives relative to unaccountable participants. Research assessing the types 
or categories of solutions as a dependent variable may reveal whether accountable 
participants are more likely to generate solutions that address irrelevant aspects of the 
problem.
Task effects. Previous research assessing the characteristics of the parking problem 
and other ill-defined problems has indicated that the parking problem is highly involving 
for problem solvers (sampled from university students) (Scherer, Butler, Reiter-Palmon, 
&Weiss, 1994). Moreover, anecdotal evidence collected by the researcher suggests that 
many participants were very concerned about and engaged in the problem. Several 
participants continued to talk about the problem and potential solutions with the 
experimenter after the experiment was over. Together this information suggests that the 
problem may have induced a great deal of motivation in problem solvers, independent of 
the experimental manipulations.
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Brickner, Harkins, and Ostrom (1986) found that typical differences in performance 
as a function of identifiability are eliminated when a task is personally involving. Brickner 
et.al. manipulated identifiability and personal involvement and found that under low 
identifiability, participants displayed social loafing and generated fewer thoughts in 
reaction to a proposal than participants in a high identifiability condition. However, when 
the proposal included plans that would affect the participants directly, these differences in 
performance disappeared. Apparently, the highly involving nature of the task motivated 
participants enough to overcome the effort reduction that usually accompanies anonymity.
The parking problem may have motivated the participants in this study in a manner 
similar to the highly involving task used by Brickner et.al (1986). All participants in this 
study believed their results would be reviewed by university employees in an attempt to 
resolve the problem. In addition, because the participants were students, it is likely that 
they felt directly affected by the problem. If participants’ motivation was enhanced 
because of the personally-involving nature of the task, there may have been less room for 
other variables such as identifiability, responsibility, and accountability to exert a 
motivational influence.
Another characteristic of the task that may have influenced the results of this 
experiment is the degree of task complexity. Relative to simple tasks requiring physical 
effort or cognitive tasks requiring expression of opinions, an ill-defined problem scenario 
with conflicting objectives can be regarded as a relatively complex task. Ill-defined 
problems do not have one right answer, allow for multiple means of solving the problem, 
and often contain irrelevant information in addition to relevant information. Such task
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complexity has been shown to moderate the effect of motivational variables on 
performance. Harkins and Petty (1982) demonstrated that when participants in a shared 
responsibility condition performed a task that was particularly challenging, performance 
was equal to that of sole responsibility participants. Follow-up studies revealed that when 
the task was challenging, participants felt that their responses represented a unique 
contribution unlikely to be duplicated by other persons. This perceived influence over 
outcomes caused participants who shared responsibility to exert just as much effort as 
participants who were solely responsible.
The most important implication of such research is that the task complexity 
moderated the effect of a motivational variable on performance. It is possible that the 
parking problem may have exerted similar influences, and these potential effects cannot be 
explored in this study. Both task involvement and task complexity were design constants 
in this study; it is possible they may have operated as moderators of the effects of 
identifiability, responsibility, and accountability on performance.
Limitations
As the previous discussion indicates, other types of problems and other types of 
cognitive tasks may lead to different results. Important task effects on problem solving 
performance have been identified in the past, and it is speculated that such effects are too 
often overlooked. The personally-involving nature of the problem and the degree of task 
complexity have been suggested as possible moderators of the effects of motivational 
variables on performance. Other task characteristics may also influence the effects of 
identifiability, responsibility, and accountability on solution quality.
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The participants used in this study can be regarded as novice problems solvers. The 
results should not be extended to research conducted on more experienced problem 
solvers, who have been known to perform very differently from novices in the problem 
solving domain. For example, experts can more readily identify the most important aspects 
of a problem and are less distracted by irrelevant surface features than novice problem 
solvers. This characteristic of experts suggests that experts may be less susceptible to the 
dilution effect of accountability. Recall that the dilution effect refers to the tendency for 
accountable people to integrate irrelevant as well as relevant information into a solution. 
Other differences between novices and experts may also moderate the effect of 
identifiability, responsibility, and accountability on solution quality.
Lastly, recall that the measure of solution quality used here was resolving power, or 
the degree to which the solutions successfully resolved the conflicting aspects of the 
problem. Other measures o f solution quality include how appropriate or original the 
solution is, for example. The results are limited to resolving power and may differ for 
creativity or other measures of decision quality.
Implications and Future Research
An extensive review of the research on identifiability, responsibility, accountability, 
and performance illustrates quite clearly that a great deal of attention has been given to the 
topic of how to motivate people to exert increased effort on both physical and cognitive 
tasks. This line of research exists in response to the well-documented tendency for people 
to be physically and cognitively lazy, especially when they perceive that they share efforts 
with others. Identifiability, responsibility, and accountability have been identified as
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possible means of decreasing these tendencies to be a cognitive miser or to diffuse 
responsibility among members of a group. Although these motivational variables have 
been recognized as a means of overcoming miserly tendencies, very little research has 
addressed the effect of motivational variables on problem-solving performance, especially 
performance on ill-defined problems. For example, identifiability and responsibility 
research primarily includes physical and low-level cognitive tasks, such as shouting and 
opinion expression. Though accountability research tends to focus more consistently on 
cognitively challenging tasks, such as impression formation, opinion expression, judgment, 
and decisions, no study prior to the present one has examined accountability influences on 
solution generation for ill-defined problems.
People regularly face ill-defined problems that elicit feelings of uncertainty and 
hesitation because no one correct answer exists. In the absence of empirical evidence to 
guide managers, unfounded prescriptions about how to motivate problem solvers to 
successfully solve these complex problems are followed. The prescriptions can be 
ineffective at best and harmful at worst. For example, within business contexts, it is 
commonly assumed that making all employees highly accountable and responsible for their 
actions will automatically elicit better performance from those employees. This prevalent 
notion has not been empirically supported thus far. In general, the current line of research 
on motivational influences on cognition and behavior must be expanded to include 
problem solving tasks, a domain which has heretofore been overlooked.
It is not yet clear how making an individual’s output identifiable affects the quality of 
the individual’s problem solving process or final solution. Scherer (1985) found that when
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outputs are identifiable, people generate more solutions to a problem than when their 
outputs are anonymous. However, solution quality was only improved when the problem 
was relatively simple. Results of the current study did not replicate the quantity effect 
found by Scherer but may lend support for the quality effect. Because the parking problem 
contains multiple conflicting objectives, such that satisfaction of one objective tends to 
preclude the satisfaction of other objectives, it may constitute a difficult problem. The task 
complexity may have eliminated the impact of identifiability on performance. Future 
research should include problems that vary in difficulty, perhaps in the degree to which 
problem objectives conflict with one another. It may be, however, that successful 
performance on ill-defined problems is inherently challenging and therefore not susceptible 
to the influence of identifiability.
It is not yet clear how requiring employees to share responsibility within a team 
environment affects the quality o f decisions made by individual members or the team as a 
whole. If  the results found here represent reality, such that people who share responsibility 
outperform people who are solely responsible, the use of responsibility as a motivational 
variable has important implications for small groups and teams. If problem solvers are 
inclined to exert more effort when they share responsibility, either because of social 
evaluation fears, competition, or the desire to achieve a group goal, then the use of teams 
may be an important means of enhancing performance.
Future research should replicate this study, perhaps with more realistic groups 
instead o f nominal groups. Research with intact groups or newly formed groups that 
actually work together will contribute to the literature on responsibility, nominal groups,
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and teams. Whereas small group performance has been addressed, less is known about 
work teams where members work somewhat independently and then combine their efforts.
Even less is known about the importance of group size on problem solving 
performance. What happens when three employees share responsibility for a problem? 
What happnes when ten people share this same responsibility? Future research should take 
into account possible differences in diffusion of responsibility as a function of group size.
Recall that a relationship between responsibility and accountability on solution 
quality was not found. However, further examination of these nonsignificant results 
appeared to indicate that responsibility resulted in performance differences only among 
participants who were highly accountable. Though this possibility could not be tested 
post-hoc, future research should specifically examine whether accountability moderates 
the effect of responsibility on solution quality. It is conceptually plausible that high 
accountability, for either a process or an outcome, could do more than simply eliminate 
differences between people who share responsibility and those who do not. That is, 
accountability could also motivate people who share responsibility to exert a higher level 
of effort, especially if individuals feel accountable to other group members.
Because empirical work has shown that people generally reduce their efforts when 
they share responsibility, the results of this study may have interesting implications for 
applied settings. It is important to find prescriptions to overcome the effects of social 
loafing. Accountability offers a potential avenue for improving individual effectiveness in a 
team context.
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It is not yet clear how requiring someone to justify their problem solving affects the 
quality of those solutions. Furthermore, does it matter whether the person is accountable 
for the process used to arrive at a solution or simply for the final solution? The importance 
of a process and outcome distinction in problem solving has yet to be determined. The 
results of this research suggest that making problem solvers accountable for their solution 
generation process or final solution will not necessarily enhance the quality of the 
solutions they generate. Siegal-Jacobs and Yates (1996) successfully demonstrated that 
making people accountable for a judgment procedure was superior to the method of 
making them accountable for the outcome of the judgment. In this study, participants had 
to make a probability judgment regarding the likelihood that an individual held a particular 
attitude, based on background information about the individual. Participants accountable 
for their judgment procedure were told that they would later be interviewed to determine 
why and how certain information was used to arrive at a probability judgment. Participants 
accountable for the outcome of the judgment were told that they would be given feedback 
regarding the accuracy of their judgment (true values were known) and that the top five 
performers would receive a bonus prize for accuracy. Although Siegal-Jacobs and Yates 
defined process and outcome accountability in a different manner from this study, both 
studies highlight the importance of different types of accountability. Future research 
should further examine such subtle differences in the way types of accountability influence 
decision making behavior. It is suggested that a stronger manipulation o f process 
accountability be used in the future because the operationalization of process 
accountability used here was somewhat weak. Either a more well-defined process could be
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utilized or, in the domain of problem solving, participants could be asked to justify their 
solutions by explaining what information they used to generate a solution and why they 
used the information that they did.
It is especially interesting to note that accountability exerted no effect on solution 
quantity. Given that accountability was the only variable manipulation that was verified by 
actual behavior, there can be no doubt about the effect of the manipulation. Despite the 
labor involved in providing written justification for a list of solutions, accountable 
participants neither decreased nor increased their solution quantity in anticipation of the 
justification. It may be that individuals varied in their reactions, such that some people 
focused more on providing a long list of solutions, whereas others focused on ensuring 
that the list was justifiable.
An especially important contribution of this study is the evidence that identifiability 
may moderate the effect of accountability on performance. In the presence of 
identifiability, unaccountable participants generated a higher proportion of resolving 
solutions than participants accountable for either the outcome or the process. Typical 
research on accountability includes both an identifiability and justification component. This 
study suggests that the identifiability component is equally important to the justification 
component for motivating behavior. The good news is that justification is usually 
accompanied with identifiability in every day life. Justification with anonymity is probably 
rare in the workplace, suggesting that the use of justification to improve performance in 
such applied environments may prove to be a desirable practice.
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Whereas the task in this study has been described as highly involving, it is possible 
that even this task is too artificial to generalize to the workplace. Though participants 
were told, and it indeed was a reality that university officials were actually given the 
solutions, there were no immediate consequences for the participants. However, it is not 
clear how much consequentiality was perceived by the participants. Some people may 
assume that being required to justify a decision means that there are automatically 
consequences to the decision. The every day use of the word accountability may bring up 
notions of responsibility, consequentiality, ownership of outcomes, etc. Although this 
study only used the word ‘justification’ and not ‘accountability’, other research should 
address the different possible interpretations of both the concept and manipulation of 
accountability and how these interpretations may alter performance. In addition to 
addressing the degree of perceived consequentiality, future research should consider the 
role of evaluation apprehension. Because participants did not have to face the people who 
were reviewing their solutions, perhaps the social evaluation in this study may have been 
too far removed. Or it is also possible that too much evaluation apprehension can act to 
hinder performance, such that very high accountability or responsibility will cause 
participants to be less creative or thoughtful. In these cases, less accountability may 
enhance performance because there is less apprehension interfering with performance. 
Future research should include both measuring individuals’ level of evaluation 
apprehension and varying the situations to include more immediate and proximal, as well 
as distal, evaluation.
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Accountability research has shown important differences in the effect of 
accountability on performance as a function of the individual to whom participants are 
accountable. Future research in problem solving should include contexts similar to the 
work environment, where expected justification is more personal and generally requires a 
face-to-face encounter and where decision outcomes are more immediate and personally 
consequential.
Although no specific predictions were made regarding the effect of identifiability, 
responsibility, and accountability on solution quantity, it is nonetheless surprising that 
there were no significant effects in any direction for any variable for solution quantity. One 
possible explanation for these null results points to the solution generation instructions 
given to all participants. Initial problem instructions asked participants to generate as many 
solutions to the problem as they could. Whereas these instructions were intended to cause 
participants to generate multiple solutions instead of just providing one final solution, the 
instructions may have caused all participants to focus on solution quantity, much like the 
instructions often given for brainstorming. Other research on social loafing, however, has 
shown that differences between shared and sole responsibility performance exist in spite of 
brainstorming instructions. Harkins and Petty (1982) gave explicit brainstorming 
instructions to all participants and still found that participants in the sole responsibility 
condition outperformed participants in the shared responsibility condition in the quantity 
of uses generated for an object.
Much of the previous discussion indicated that more attention should be paid to the 
solution generation instructions given in the future, given that these instructions may have
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the potential to moderate the effects of many variables on solution generation. Instructions 
to brainstorm, focus on quantity, or focus on quality should be manipulated instead of 
used as a design constant because it is not clear whether instructions may serve to 
motivate participants in differential ways, independent of any other interventions.
In addition to the direct effects o f motivational variables such as identifiability, 
responsibility, and accountability, future research must continue attempts to identify the 
joint effects of these variables as well as direct attention to individual difference, task, and 
situational moderators. Do people vary in their response to anticipated evaluation? Do 
some people perceive accountability as a threatening, and therefore anxiety-producing, 
influence? Do others perceive accountability as a challenge they aspire to meet? What 
about individual differences in need for cognition, intelligence, and expertise? How do 
these motivational variables affect individuals who have a proclivity to perform well in the 
first place? How is performance affected by an important and highly involving task? How 
does task complexity affect performance? Does it matter whether an individual is 
accountable to a peer or to a superior? All of these questions and many more must be 
addressed if we expect to offer valuable contributions to the literature on motivation, 
problem solving, and small groups and to advise practitioners interested in improving 
problem solving performance within their organizations.
Clearly, the nature of the interactions among identifiability, responsibility, and 
accountability remain unclear. It is important to note, however, that this study does not 
suggest that having more motivational influences is always better. Whereas one 
motivational influence at a time may enhance performance, additional influences do not
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appear to have an additive effect. It may be that a moderate level of identifiability, 
responsibility, and accountability is required to maximize performance. Too much 
responsibility and accountability may have the potential to induce high arousal and anxiety, 
neither of which facilitate performance, especially during difficult tasks. These variables 
appear to interact in a complicated way, and an easy solution is not yet on the horizon.
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Appendix A 
Parking Problem
It is difficult to find a parking space at UNO. There is approximately one parking space for 
every two people on campus, and although this doesn’t sound too bad, anyone who has 
tried to find a spot at 10 a.m. knows there is a problem. The park just south of the 
university provides additional parking spaces, but it is also filled during peak hours. 
Although there has been talk of building an access road to UNO to ease traffic congestion, 
there is concern that increased traffic through the park would be dangerous for children. In 
addition, large old trees would have to be cut down, and some residents have complained 
that some of the charm of the park would be lost if a road was built. There are plenty of 
parking spaces available at Ak-Sar-Ben, but students who park there must take a time 
consuming bus ride to campus. In addition, the university must run costly buses to and 
from Ak-Sar-Ben even in the late afternoon when there is only an occasional passenger. 
The university is sensitive to the complaints of students and would like to solve the 
parking problem at UNO, but state budget cuts have severely limited the funds available to 
handle such matters. The university does not know what to do.
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Appendix B 
Resolving Power (RPVParking Problem
Essential Conflict:
The goals of the university to maintain good community relations and live within 
the university budget.
The goals of the students to have more convenient (hassle-free) parking so 
students can get to class in a timely manner.
One side of the conflict (Either university OR student goals):
Rating
1
General RP-Solution doesn’t do a very good job addressing any aspects/facets of 
the problem.
* Parking Problem-Solution addresses either subaspect (community relations vs 
budget; or more convenient parking vs. timeliness) of one side -does not do a very 
goodjob
Exemplar- Provide limousine service. (Could possibly be more convenient, but 
not necessarily; definitely doesn’t consider budget, and may actually cause 
problems with community due to traffic)
General RP Solution addresses one aspect/facet of the problem moderately well. 
^Parking Problem- Two Possibilities:
1) Solution addresses either subaspect o f one side fairly well OR
2) Solution addresses both subaspects of one side not so well
Exemplar Campaign for donations around Metro area (Addresses budget issues, 
may harm community relations, and can’t be sure of how the student concerns 
would be handled with this money)
3
General RP Solution effectively addresses one aspect/facet of the problem.
* Parking Problem Solution addresses both subaspects (community relations and 
budget OR more convenient parking and timeliness) of one side well
Exemplar- Build parking lots in Elmwood park. (More convenient and less time- 
consuming parking, but doesn’t take into account community relations or budget)
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Both sides of the conflict (Both university AND student goals):
Rating
4
General RP Solution seems to attempt to address one aspect/facet o f the problem.
^Parking Problem -  Solution attempts to address one subaspect of each side- 
does not do a very good job
Exemplar- Build a new parking lot. Charge students to help offset funding for 
project. (Creates more parking, but not clear how convenient or time consuming; 
addresses budget issues, but again not clear about community relations because it 
doesn’t say where lot would be built)
5
General RP Solution resolves the conflicting aspects of the problem moderately 
well.
* Parking Problem- Two Possibilities:
1) Solution addresses 3 subaspects (2 university, 1 student OR 1 university, 2 
student) fairly well OR
2) Solution addresses all 4 subaspects (2 university, 2 student) not so well
Exemplar- We can avoid a peak time; get up early and go to school before class 
begins, we can park anywhere. (Maintains community relations within budget; may 
be reduced hassle, but is time consuming)
6
General RP Solution does a very good job resolving the conflicting aspects of the 
problem.
*Parking Problem-Solution addresses all 4 subaspects o f both sides well
Exemplar- If the foundation of the present parking garage is sound or needs to be 
made more fundamentally sound, then secure the present three floors and build 
another three to four floors of stalls. This could be a campus/community effort in 
that faculty and students work as a team. For example, have Mannheim 
Steamroller perform and donate the majority of the proceeds into a trust. Have 
several quality events and speakers and invest the monies into a secure program at 
a reasonable rate. (Would provide more convenient and less time consuming 
parking as well as maintain community relations within budget)
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Appendix C 
Manipulation Check Questions
INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING 
STATEMENTS. PLEASE FILL IN THE NUMBERED CIRCLE ON THE ANSW ER 
SHEET BETWEEN 0 AND 9 WHICH BEST REPRESENTS YOUR LEVEL OF 
AGREEMENT FOR EACH STATEMENT.
1. The solutions and responses I have provided can be traced to me personally.
0-------1------- 2--------3-------4--------5------- 6------- 7-------8--------9
strongly disagree strongly agree
2. When I thought of each of the solutions, I mentally justified each one before writing it 
down.
0------- 1------- 2------- 3------- 4------- 5------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
strongly disagree strongly agree
3. The solutions and responses I have provided will be combined with solutions provided 
by other students, to be reviewed by the university.
0------- 1------ 2------- 3------- 4------- 5------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
strongly disagree strongly agree
4. The solutions and responses I have given are anonymous.
0-------1------- 2--------3-------4--------5------- 6------- 7-------8--------9
strongly disagree strongly agree
5. I alone have provided solutions to a particular problem, to be reviewed by the 
university.
0-------- 1------2--------3--------4-------5------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
strongly disagree strongly agree
6. In generating solutions, I thought about whether or not my solutions could be 
defended as good solutions.
0-------- 1------2--------3--------4-------5------- 6------- 7-------8--------9
strongly disagree strongly agree
Note. Questions 3 and 4 were reverse coded. Questions 1,3, and 6 were chosen to select participants.
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Appendix D 
Task Instructions
All Participants
As you have just read, you have agreed to participate in a study to examine how 
people solve real world problems. You will be asked to generate solutions to a problem 
and complete seveial questionnaires. This should take approximately 45 to 60 minutes to 
complete. You are guaranteed extra credit for this amount of time; however, should the 
task take longer, credit will be given for this additional time as well.
Please read the following problem and write down as many solutions as possible for 
the problem. Take as much time as you need to provide all o f the solutions that you can 
think of. Please feel free to reread the problem as often as you like. When you can’t think 
of any more solutions, choose the solution that you feel is the BEST solution and circle it.
Low Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, No Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous 
and not traceable to you. They will be pooled with those of other participants who are also 
responding to this same problem. All of the solutions generated by the study participants 
will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this problem.
Low identifiability, Sole Responsibility, No Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous 
and not traceable to you. A series of problems is being investigated, but you alone are 
responsible for generating solutions to the following problem. Your solutions will be 
considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this problem.
Low identifiability, Shared Responsibility, Outcome Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide will be strictly anonymous and will not be 
traceable to you. They will be pooled with those of other participants who are also
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responding to the same problem. All o f the solutions generated by the study participants 
will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this problem. After you 
have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate the solution you think is 
best and provide a written justification of why you think chosen solution is the best one.
Low Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, Outcome Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous 
and not traceable to you. A series of problems is being investigated, but you alone are 
responsible for generating solutions to the following problem. Your solutions will be 
considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this problem. After you have 
finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate the solution you think is best 
and provide a written justification of why you think the chosen solution is the best one.
Low Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, Process Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous 
and not traceable to you. The will be pooled with those of other participants who are 
responding to the same problem. All the solutions generated by the study participants will 
be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt ot solve this problem. After you 
have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to provide a written justification for 
each of your solutions.
Low Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, Process Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous 
and not traceable to you. A series of problems is being investigated, but you alone are 
responsible for generating solutions to the following problem. Other participants are 
working on different problems. Your solutions will be considered by UNO staff members 
in their attempt to solve this problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you
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will be asked to indicate the solution you think is best and provide a written justification 
for each of your solutions.
High Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, No Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide will be pooled with those of other 
participants who are also responding to this same problem. We will ask you to record your 
name so that your status as a student can be verified. All o f the solutions generated by the 
study participants will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this 
problem.
High Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, No Accountability
A series o f problems is being investigated, but you alone are responsible for 
generating solutions to the following problem. Other participants are working on different 
problems. We will ask you to record your name so that your status as a student can be 
verified. Your solutions will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve 
this problem.
High Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, Outcome Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide will be pooled with those of other 
participants who are also responding to the same problem. We will ask you to record your 
name so that your status as a student can be verified. All of the solutions generated by the 
study participants will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this 
problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate the 
solution you think is best and provide a written justification of why you think chosen 
solution is the best one.
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High Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, Outcome Accountability
A series o f problems is being investigated, but you alone are responsible for 
generating solutions to the following problem. Other students are working on different 
problems. We will ask you to record your name so that your status as a student can be 
verified. Your solutions will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve 
this problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate 
the solution you think is best and provide a written justification of why you think the 
chosen solution is the best one.
High Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, Process Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide will be pooled with those of other 
participants who are responding to the same problem. We will ask you to record your 
name so that your status as a student can be verified. All of the solutions generated by the 
study participants will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this 
problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to provide a 
written justification for each of your solutions.
High Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, Process Accountability
A series of problems is being investigated, but you alone are responsible for 
generating solutions to the following problem. Other participants are working on different 
problems. We will ask you to record your name so that your status as a student can be 
verified. Your solutions will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve 
this problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate 
the solution you think is best and provide a written justification for each of your solutions.
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Appendix E
Table 14
Secondary Main Effects Analyses for Quantity of Solutions Resulting from Tests of 
Interactions
Source n SS df MS
1. Id X Resp
Identifiability
Responsibility
2. Id X Account
Identifiability
Accountability
3. Resp X Account
Responsibility
Accountability
.27 1
7.53 1
90
.05 1
32.12 2
72
9.41 1
14.63 2
.27 .05 .82
7.53 1.44 .23
.05 .01 .93
16.06 2.73 .07
9.41 1.47 .23
7.31 1.14 .33
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Appendix E (cont)
Table 15
Secondary Main Effects Analyses for Number of Resolving Solutions Resulting from
Source n SS df MS F £
1. Id X Resp
Identifiability
77
.00 1 .00 .00 .98
Responsibility 2.74 1 2.74 1.20 .28
2. Id X Account
Identifiability
90
6.24 1 6.24 3.77 .06
Accountability 3.58 2 1.79 1.08 .34
3. Resp X Account
Responsibility
72
1.90 1 1.90 .88 .35
Accountability 6.09 2 3.05 1.40 .25
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Appendix E (cont)
Table 16
Secondary Main Effects Analyses for Proportion of Resolving Solutions Resulting from 
Tests of Interactions
Source n SS df MS
1. Id X Resp
Identifiability
Responsibility
2. Id X Account
Identifiability
Accountability
3. Resp X Account
s '
Responsibility
Accountability
.04 1
.19 1
91
.93 1
.42 2
73
.25 1
.02 2
.04 .45 .51
.19 2.42 .12
.93 12.90 .00
.21 2.87 .06
.25 2.75 .10
.01 .10 .90
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Appendix E
Table 17
Secondary Main Effects Analyses for Best Solution Resulting from Tests of Interactions
Source n SS df MS
1. Id X Resp
Identifiability
Responsibility
2. Id X Account
Identifiability
Accountability
3. Resp X Account
Responsibility
Accountability
2.98 1
2.49 1
91
5.83 1
10.88 2
73
3.80 1
13.45 2
2.98 1.81 .18
2.49 1.51 .22
5.83 5.01 .03
5.44 4.67 .01
3.80 2.51 .12
6.72 4.44 .02
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Appendix F 
Three-wav Interaction Cell Sizes
Identifiability
Accountability by Responsibility Low High
No Accountability
Shared Responsibility 2 1
Sole Responsibility 3 1
Outcome Accountability
Shared Responsibility 4 3
Sole Responsibility 5 2
Process Accountability
/
Shared Responsibility 5 8
Sole Responsibility 4 3
